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The evil that men do lives after them; 
The good is oft interred with their bones. 
-- .Shakespeare 
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This is not a paper on Plato -- at least not consciously. It 
is a paper on 20th Century analysis of Plato ways in which Plato 
has been looked at, could be looked at, and, perhaps, should be 
looked at. �ost of all, it is a plea for clarity of intellectual 
position. 
Plato is a unique figure in political theory. In one way, his 
thought seems very detached from our own. His culture and language 
have long been lost; his style of presenting arguments is alien to 
our own. Yet even most of his "critics," find something strangely 
alluring in his writing. Warner Fite notes that people think of 
1 Plato as if a mystical, even divine, aura surrounded him. Whether 
it is because of some esthetic:-attractiveness in his vision, some 
in0enuity in his presentation, some depth in his understanding or 
merely some exaggeration in his reputation, writers simply do not 
think of Plato in the way they think of Hobbes, Machiavelli or 
hietzsche. 
Dealing with Plato's reputation has sometimes been difficult. 
Some writers have taken it upon themselves to attack Plato and prove 
that he was just a mere mortal; this has led others to take up the 
moral cause of defending Plato with an all-but-religious furvor. 
This is unfortunate, because the loser in such battles will never 
be Plato, but may very well be ourselves. I see Plato neither as 
a 00d who must be dethroned, nor a cause which must be defended, 
but rather as an incredible resource which is all too often wasted. 
Politics is not an easy process. Almost daily, we are forced 
to choose between competing values. These choices take place over 
iwarner ?ite, The Platonic Leqend {New York, Charles Scribner's 
Son's, 1934), pp.�3. Fite is one of the writers who sets out 
to dispel! this image. 
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things as minor as whether we choose to uphold the value of free 
expression or the value of peace and quiet when our neighbor's 
record player is turned up too loud, or as major as whether we 
choose to uphold one or the other value when political dissidents 
ask to speak in a public forum. To make a choice between conflicting 
val1.1es is amon0 t�e most important and difficult challenges indi­
viduals must face, and we owe it to ourselves not to make these 
choices blindly. To understand how to make these decisions, we must 
try to learn why we hold the values we hold: where they came from 
and what we are rejecting when we hold some values and not others. 
It is here that the study of the ideas of the past becomes so 
important. Th is study can help us in three ways: first, it can 
help us to see what it means to have different perspectives on 
pol itics, and thus, broaden our viewpoint; second, it can help us 
to understand ourselves, by allowing us to see where our ideas about 
politics came from and what these ideas mean; finally, it can help 
us to act, by giving us a framework in which we can make sense of 
our choices between values. The study of ideas of the past can 
help us to learn what we believe and why, and this knowledge about 
our values helps us to choose between them. 
Plato is amazingly well-geared to help us in finding what our 
values are, precisely because he seems to have such a power over 
them. Somehow, our intellectual roots seem to lie in Plato's 
dialogues, if for no other reason than the fact that Plato is the 
source for so much of our political language.2 Yet Plato's argument 
is different from our own. Thus, Plato represents not only a source 
2see Sheldon s. ·dolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown 
�, Co. , ,1960) ! pp. 27, 33, cf. Eric A. Havelock, � Liberal Temper 1..!J. Gree,< Pol1t1cs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) , p. 12. 
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of our ideas about politics, but also a challenge to these ideas. 
Plato raised a wealth of questions about politics. If we are to 
answer them differently from the way he did, the study of Plato 
co�pells us to figure out why. 
This paper has two purposes. The first is to develop a theory 
about what approach to the ideas of the past in general, and Plato 
in particular, will help us the most in learning how to act in 
politics. I hope to do this by examining and evaluating the ways 
in which 20th Century analysts have looked at Plato. The second 
purpose is to provide an example of the type of analysis I believe 
to be the most useful. I hope to apply my approach not to Plato, 
but to those who have analyzed Plato, in an effort to make the 
most use of these writers' ideas. Chapter One is a general over­
view of the analysts I will be discussing; Chapters Two, Three and 
Four deal with what it means to approach Plato in a particular way; 
Chapter Five provides a discussion of what approach to Plato is 
likely to be the most useful; Chapter Six is a brief conclusion. 
My analysis rests on two important initial assumptions. The 
first is that political action is based on political ideas that 
individuals make choices in politics based on the theoretical values 
they hold. The second assumption that the goal of understanding 
our values -- the principles on which we act -- is best served 
when we challenge them with as many different views about politics 
as possible. I will be suggesting that it is not the nature of 
the view of politics an author has, but rather an autho�'s failure 
to be cognizant of the limitations of his/her viewpoint that makes 
an approach to political thought less than useful. 
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This last point needs some clarification. I believe that the 
attempt to view the past inevitably involves a tradeoff between 
presenting a thinker' s ideas "faithfully" in the way he/she had 
intended them to be presented, and viewing a thinker's ideas in the 
ways we would like to.3 As J. G. A. Pocock suggests, the attempt 
to study the past is an act of translation,4 and I believe that 
somelhing is always lost in translation. Much as we might like to 
have Plato's opinions on modern questions, Plato never addressed 
the problems of industrialized mass society, or, for that matter, 
t�e threat of totalitarian regimes to individual liberty. To apply 
Plato to our modern world can only be accomplished if we extra­
polate from what he said, and we must realize that we do this at 
the cost of fidelity to Plato's intentions. Yet, an analysis which 
seeks to avoid extrapolating from Plato's ideas is done at the cost 
of limiting the extent to which Plato's ideas can be applied to our 
own problems. 
This tradeoff is especially important because 'the process of de­
cidino �'what Plato said" can never be completely severed from that 
of deciding "what Plato means to us." It is clear that we cannot 
hope to evaluate Plato unless we have some idea about what it is 
Plato said. It its sometimes forgotten, however, that we cannot 
determine what Plato said without bringing in some of our precon­
ceptions about what sor ts of issues political theory ought to address. 
Plato could never have been seen to address the issue of whether 
politics should be based on a "limits-to-growth" perspective, until 
that issue became important to those who read Plato. 
3J. Renford Bambrough makes a similar argument about what he calls 
'.:he "paradox of the universal sympathetic interpretation." He argues 
tha� any observer who disagrees with Plato is liable to misinterpret 
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This seems to leave us with two alternatives: either we give 
up on the possibility of learning from the past altogether, or we 
make ourselves aware of the fact that any approach to the past we 
may use is limited, and accept the possibility that there may be 
something to be gained from each of many approaches. I choose to 
support the latter. I will argue that to make the most use of the 
past, we must be both conscious of the assumptions we have had to 
make, and tolerant of approaches which differ from our own. 
Accordingly, I am painfully aware of some of the compromises 
that I have had to make in this work -- for I, too, seek both to 
interpret and evaluate. These will be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapters One and Five. The reader may also learn something of 
mv biases by reading the Bibliographic Essay which I have included. 
:n �Y own defense, I can only hope that the reader, rather than 
rejecting my arguments because of the limitations in my perspective, 
will try to profit from learning of these limitations. 
the ideas of Plato, and yet, refraining from interpretation rele­
oates all theoretical works to a pgsition of solely antiquarian 
.i.nterest. .See his essay, "Plato ?lodern Friends and Enemies," 
reprin�ed in J. Renford 3ambrough, ed. , Plato, . Popper and Politics 
(Cambridge, England: W. Heffer and Son's Limited, 1967),pp. 6-7. 
t:. . 
�J. G. A. Pocock, "Languages and Their Implications: The Trans-
formation of the Study of Political Thow;1ht," in Politics, Language 
and� (New York: Atheneum, 1973), p. 7. 
CHAPTER ONE: On Analyzi�a Analysts 
John Wild has commented that "almos t every influential modern 
ethical position has been imputed to Plato. " 5 Indeed, 20th Century 
analysts have thought of Plato as, among other things, the sym�ol 
of totalitarianism, the source of the natural law tradition, the 
progenitor of all Western thought, and as a petty aristocrat with 
a poor understanding of human nature and questionable morals. To 
try to discuss and compare such diverse views is something of a 
challenge, and there is certainly more than one way of going about 
it. 
It is for this reason that I have decided to begin this study 
by providing a general qverview of the nature of 20th Century 
analysis of Plato, 6 and a brief discussion of how I will be 
approaching the subject. In this chapter, I will explain why I 
feel it is useful to study those who have analyzed Plato, and why 
I have chosen to examine the particular writers I have; I will also 
discuss the method I will be using to examine these analysts, and 
finally, the way in which this study will be organized. 
Why study analysts of Plato? The answer to this question is 
twofold. First, it is useful to study those who have analyzed Plato 
for the same sort of reason that it is useful to study Plato -- such 
a study can help us to understand ourselves, and to act politically. 
I believe that we can learn something about the way individuals view 
politics, by examining how they view Plato. Each of these analysts 
c:; 
�John Wild, Plato' s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law 
(Chicago: The.University of Chicago Press"'; 1953), pp. 61-62. 
-
6A more specific summary of each of  the analyses of Plato which 
will be discussed in the study is provided in the Bibliographic 
Essay which follows the text. 
(6) 
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read the same works, and had roughly the same line of historical 
investigation open to them, and yet many reached different concl u­
sions about what Plato said, and how we should view Plato's message. 
Sxamining how modern writers have seen Plato is a way of assessing 
how modern political experiences -- such a liberal democracy, 
totalitarianism, mass politics, technological growth and philoso­
phies of history -- have affected 20th Century political thought. 
Second, an examination of 20th Century analysts of Plato is 
useful for providing what a discussion of Plato cannot -- it can 
help us to understand what ways of approaching the past are likely 
to be the most useful. Plato is a tremendous resource, 'but he can­
not teach us how to use his ideas. It is only through examining 
what it means to take each of a variety of approaches to Plato that 
we can learn what the costs of taking a particular approach to Plato 
is, and ultimately what makes some approaches more productive than 
ot�ers. Thus, a study of 20th Century analysis of Plato can be 
useful both for gaining knowledge abou t ourselves, and knowledge 
about the useful ways of viewing the past. 
�hv t�ese particular analysts? I have chosen the particular 
writers I will be discussing because I find their arguments inter­
esting and illustrative, and not necessarily because they represent 
the most important works on Plato. This is not to say that I have 
consciously avoided works which have been influential, but rather 
that I have tried to include works which have not been the subject 
of a great deal of critical d iscussion in an effort to present a 
wide range of views on Plato. 
As will become apparent, I have tried to discuss writers whose 
views differ a great deal from my own, and even writers whose argu-
-8-
ments I find untenable and unconvincin0. Because this is intended 
to be a discussion of the ways in which Plato has been analyzed, 
and not an analysis of Plato, I will only assess the value of gene­
ral approaches and will not devote space in the text to expressing 
my disagreement with specific arguments. It should be understood, 
however, that silence is by no means intended to imply consent. 
The. inverse is also true, however. Because I will be trying to 
find the implications and costs of taking an approach to Plato, my 
wri ting may tend to sound, at times, as if I am merely trying to 
debunk the analysis done on Plato. This is not my intent. I believe 
that almos t all the views I will be discussing have at least some 
meri ts as arguments, and all are interesting enough to be worth 
contemplating. As I mentioned in the introduction, I believe that 
there are limitations in any approach to the past one might use; 
it is essential to understand the limitations of an argument if we 
are to use it effectively. 
How this study will be approached. My analysis will involve both 
interpretation and evaluation. In my interpretation, I hope to take 
advanta?e of what I believe to be an unusual perspective to discover 
what is at stake in deciding to view Pla to in a particular way. The 
perspective I will use will be to examine not only wha t the analysts 
say, but also what sorts of assumptions underlie their approaches, 
and what sorts of arguments would challenge their position. The 
issues at stake include not only the question of how Plato ought to 
be viewed, but also how useful the past can possibly be in helping 
us to ac t, and what sor ts of political ideology ought to be more 
in�l1.1ent5.al in our thinkinq. I hope to discover not only what these 
writers have accepted when they chose to approach Plato in a parti­
cular way, but also what they have rejected. 
-9-
In my evaluation, I hope to determine how successful these wri­
ters have been in helping us to understand ourselves, and thus, to 
act in politics. ' I will try to find the limitations in their argu-
ments, and assess how significant these limitations are. Finally, 
in Chapter 2ive, I will  discuss what elements of analysis make one 
approach more useful than another. 
�{ow this studv will be orcanized. I will discuss the approaches 
to Plato along three different levels of analysis. At the first 
level is the question "should Plato be studied at all?"; at the 
second is the question "assuming that Plato is worth studying, can 
we possible make use of his ideas?''; at the third is the question 
"assuming that we can use Plato's ideas, how can we go about doing 
so most effec tively?'' Each of these will be discussed briefly here. 
In Chapter Two, I will discuss some analysts who address the 
question "should Plato be studied at all?" -- or in other words, 
''was Plato sufficiently perceptive in his comments on the human 
experience that his views can possibly help us?'  Writers who 
answer "no" to this question suggest that it is not worth the 
effort to try to relate Plato's time to our own. In this chapter, 
I will be primarily concerned with the arguments of John Jay Chapman 
and ·,·Jarner ? i te. 
In Chapter Three, I will discuss analysts who address the ques­
tion "can we possibly make use of Plato's ideas" -- i.e. 'tan we 
apply what Pl ato said to our own political problems?" This question 
.. One might well ask at this point, "did each of these writers in-
tend to be useful in this way1'' I bel ieve that this basis of evalua­
tion is fair because I def ine "usefulness" very broadly. All writers 
seek to be "useful" in the sense that they .try to increase our under­
standino abotJt some aspect of our world, and I believe that it is 
reasonable to judge w�iters based on the extent to which they achieve 
".:his end. 
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has involved whether it is possible to transcend differences in 
political environment and in perceptions of "politics" to compare 
Plato's ideas to our own. Writers who believe that such a compari­
son cannot be made suggest that there is no reason to try to deter­
mine some "best" way of using Plato's ideas. Writers who believe 
that Plato's thought can be compared with our own. have divided over 
t�e best way of making the comparison. This chap ter wil l  include a 
discussion of quite a few writers, most importantly, Alban Dewes 
�inspear, Karl Popper, Charles Howard Mcilwain, G. Lowes Dickinson, 
Eric Havelock, Alvin Gouldner, F. E. Sparshott, Sheldon Wolin and 
David Grene. 
In Chapter Four, I will discuss analysts who present ways of 
making use of Plato's ideas. Specifically I will examine three of 
the more interesting ways in which 20th Century analysts have viewed 
Plato -- the view of Pla to as a "totalitarian" or a "democrat", the 
view of Plato as a "natural law theorist", and the view-.of Plato as 
a "limits-to-growth" theorist. I will discuss what is at stake in 
each of these views, and how these approaches differ, as well as 
how effective each is in he lping us to make use of Plato. Among 
the writers who will be discussed in this chapter are: J. Renford 
Bambrough, Bertrand Russe ll, Karl Popper, R. H. s. Crossman, Ronald 
Levinson, John Hallowell,  Leo Strauss, John Wild, Mulford a. Sibley 
and William Ophuls. 
CHAPTER TWO: Is Plato Worth Studyinq? 
I begin my discussion of how Plato has been analyzed with an 
examination of two writers who question whether Plato ought to be 
studied at all. These two writers -- John Jay Chapman and Warner 
Fite -- are worth reviewing not because their position is a popu­
lar one, but rather because the extreme nature of their argument 
has interesting implications. Studying Chapman and Fite is�useful 
not only for discovering what it means to suggest that Plato's 
aroument is of no value, but also for illuminating the assumptions 
one must make if one is to argue t�at Plato deserves consideration. 
Moreover, while it is unusual for analysts to suggest that a major 
theorist of the past was imperceptive, and even dangerous, such an 
arcument has become quite important in other contexts. As such, a 
study of Chapman and Fite is useful for understanding some of the 
ideological issues at stake when one suggests that Darwin is not 
worth studying, or that it is dangerous to be exposed to the argu­
ments of Communists or Nazis. 
My discussion in this chapter will be directed toward answe-ring 
t�e following questions: first, "what is one saying when one suggests 
that Plato ouqht not to be studied?" -- "what assumptions are involved 
in taking such a position?"; second, "what does this view imply about 
the way we ought to view the past, and about the way we ought to 
view our own political questions?"; finally, "how useful is this 
approach in helping us to understand ourselves?''• Each will be 
discussed, in turn. 
What is one sayina when one suqqests that Plato ouoht not to be 
studied? Like all writers who attempt to approach Plato, Chapman 
and Fite have to deal not only with Plato's arguments, but also 
(11) 
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with Plato's reputation. Unlike most of the other writers, Chapman 
and Fite suggest that this reputation is almost totally ungrounded. 
While the objections they raise to Plato's argument e. g. faulting 
Plato for suqgesting that the state should be ruled by those with 
"technical know-how" rather than those with "common sense'' -- are not 
q all that unusual,� the conclusion they draw about Plato is. Chapman 
and ?ite suggest that differences between our views �nd Plato's 
should not be considered merely as differences in opinion or per­
spective, but rather as evidence of Plato's lack of perception and 
�ailure to understand human nature. For Fite and Chapman, Plato was 
an unexceptional thinker, who is not worth our time. 
�either of these two writers suggest reasons why one ought to 
· approach Plato with a view towards deciding how perceptive he was. 
As such, one can only attempt to infer what their assumptions about 
political thought and analysis are from the nature of their argument. 
The two most important assumptions seem to concern what we can know 
abot1t politics, and how we shoul d treat ideas which differ from our 
own. 
Chapman and Fite imply that there are some statements one could 
�ake about the nature of man and politics which are true and have 
�een true since Plato's time. They assume that anyone who is rea­
sona�ly perceptive knows what these truths are, and that anyone who 
does no� recogn ize these truths is obviously less than perceptive. 
Among these truths is that pederasty is immoral and unpermi�sable 
l__// 
(Chapman) and that there is no place for an aristocratic or ''techno-
cratic" elite in political rule (Fite). 9 
·si�ilar arguments are made by Karl Popper, R. H. s. Crossman and 
r1. =· Finley, among others. See Bibliographic Essay. 
9see 3ibl ioqraphic Essay for a further discussion of their arguments. 
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To unders tand what it means to make these assumptions about 
political knowledge, it is helpful to see what some confl icting 
as s n:np t i on s  woul d look U. ke. First, one might suggest tha t  there 
are no s uch thinqs as "knowable truths" of the sort Chapman and Fite 
describe that  these are merely societal understand ings or a ba-
/Z_� 
4ence of opini ons with no intrinsic "rightness"; this is  the sort 
'-------', 
of argument Popper , Cros sman and Wol in make. Second, one might 
suqgest. that there are "knowabl e  truths" but that these truths are 
t i�ebound -- that what is true for us may not have been true for Plato; 
t � is is the pers pective one might f ind in some sort of theory of 
10 � i s torical development. F inally, one might sugges t that, whil e 
t here are "knowable truth s , "  very few peopl e are capable of such 
k nowl edqe, and that Chapman and Fite are not among this select group ; 
t h is i s  the sort of argument Leo Strauss might make. Thus, Chapman 
a nd P i te impl icitly re j ect a wide  range of poss ibl e pos itions when they 
hold that the average individual knows what is "ri ght " in politics. 
The second as sum ption Chapman and F ite seem to make is that an 
aroument wh ich dif fers from our own ouqht to be re j ected. Chapman 
even goes so far as to s uggest tha t Plato ' s views on moral ity are 
dangerous , and both bel ieve that Plato's argument  is not real ly 
worth  con sidering. To Chapman · and F ite, any differing idea mus t be 
n o t  only "wrong " but pporly conceived, and cannot be l earned from. 
! lere aga in, it is useful to examine what d iffering assumptions 
m i ·-- � t  look like. One mi ·:--;ht suggest that a "wrong" idea is not neces­
sari l y  poorly conceived and, in fact, that the really dangerous 
i deas are those t ha t  are "wrong" but are conceived so well as to be 
'1 n -"�Alban \'.Jin s pear appl ies this sort of view of historical develop-
�1en t  to ana l yzing Plato, but does not feel that there ever have been 
"tru t h s "  in the way Chapman and F ite use the term. See Chapter Three. 
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persuasive ; tha t is the argument M. I. Finley makes. Alternatively, 
one mig h t  suggest that even if an argument is "wrong" and poorly con­
ceived , we ought to review it, if only to discover what led someone 
to make such a poor argument ; this point is raised by Alvin Gouldner. 
Thus , it is significant that Chapman and F ite as sume both that one 
can tell that a belief . about politics is  "wrong , "  and that nothing 
can be learned from a wrong belief. These two assumptions seem to 
set them apart from a great many other writers. 
Wha t does th is view imply? This question, like the last, is some­
wha t d ifficult to answer. Because Chapman and Fite are not very clear 
a �o1 1 t  wha t t he i r  a s �urnptions are, one cannot always be sure whether 
a par t icul ar view of the past or of politics is a basi s on which they 
make their argument, or an impl ication that one can draw from their 
a rq ur:1ent. Here again ,  I will try to make inferfences based on my 
view of their argument. 
Chapman and P i te seem to accept that the use we can, and ought to, 
ma�e of the past is quite limited. They suggest that we can look to 
ot her ideas onl y for positive reinforcement of those things the 
averare individual knows to be true. According ly, they imply that 
the average individual is capable of judging on some objective 
s tanda rd whether a thinker of the past is useful, and , in turn that 
a t hinker may be "ob j ectively uninspiring " even though he/ she has 
unden i ab l y  i n spired others. To Chapman and Fite, such inspiration 
can  only be t �e power of a false prophet. 
More importa ntly , Chapman and Fite seem to imply that the whole 
proces s of at tempting to specul ate about the principles which underlie 
po l i t ics  is not very usef ul. They believe that we can know everything 
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importan t  about politics through "common sense" and that nothing 
can be gained by challenging these ideas. This is an interesting 
view of politica l ideology; it sugge sts  tat what helps us to act 
politically , and reach our "goal s "  as a society, is  an acceptance 
of what we all generally know to be correct, rather than an effort 
to d i scover more about our wor ld, and our selves ,  through "rational" 
means. In  s hort, the way Chapman and Fite approach Plato implies 
t ha t  the pa st can only be used to find ideas which agree with our 
own , and suggests a view of politics which might be termed , at the 
r .i s 1 :  of oven::enert1 l i zation, " an t l-intellectualism. " 
t-fow usef�l_�J .. s thi s approach? I have tried to suggest the the 
understanding s Chapman and Fite seem to have of political analysis is  
far  from universal. Yet, the real weaknes s  of their argument is  not 
t hat it rests on as sumptions which one might disagree with , but rather 
tha t is re:; ts on as sumptions which cannot be "disagreed" with. As 
such , I believe their argument to be unconvincing and untestable. 
Chapman and :ite seem to as sume the "common s ense"  will l ead u s  
to understand why t h e  stud y of confl icting theory cannot possibly 
be productive -- i. e. that we already know their approach to be 
• .i- · t ·  1 t 11 1 n �u1 1 ve y correc .  Yet, if a reader does not already agree 
with the approach -- i. e. if he/she lack s "common s ense" -- the 
reader i s  un l ikely to be won over to Chapman and Fite's argument, 
� i nce their viewpoint is  not one which can be �ccepted "r� tionaJ lyJ�  
�o put this another way, much more than assuming that everyone 
11chapman, for example , argues  that Plato ''takes the mind off 
i ts troubles and s upplies it with imaginative solutions for problems 
which do not press." Chapman believes this to be an objective state­
r:1ent about the way P lato affects anyone with "common sense. " Lucian, 
P l� ,  and Greek i'-·1ora ls ( Cambr idge, Mas s. : The Riverside Pre s s , 193 1), 
pp • 1 ? 2 - J. 7 3 • 
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ough t  to agree with t heir argument, Chapman and F ite assume tha t  
everyone who is suff iciently perceptive already does, and that any-
one w�o is not perceptive those Chapman calls "armchair visionaries" 
-- never will. Thus, the larce , number of people who do not agree 
wi th  t he assump tions Chapman and Fite make sugges ts that ''common 
sense" i s  not very common at  all.1 3  
Moreover , their approach cannot be tested -- empirically or analy­
tically. Because Chapman and Fite do not set out what their criteria 
are for determining whe t her a writer is worth studying, one can never 
decide whether they have j udged Plato accurately. When the reader 
can only infer criteria from the judgement, it is impossible to 
tes t a writer ' s  consistency. Here again, the very d ifferent conclu­
sio�s Leo S trauss reaches from what would seem to be a similar assump­
tion about t�e ex is tence of political knowledge, suggests that the 
accuracy of the j udgement Chapman and F i te make could at  least be 
c'1a llenaed. 
T�e i�pact of these two arguments -- that Chapman and Fite are 
very unlikel y to convince someone to agree with their viewpoint, and 
that  their approach cannot be tes ted -- is to suggest that their argu­
men t is les s  than useful to anyone who makes d if ferent assumptions 
or r:.o: ies to different conclusions. This problem s tems not from the 
�act  t hat their position is usual , but rather because they never 
expla i �  t he way in which their position really challenges others. 
I t  i s  only when we know t he reasons for adopting a viewpoint that 
we can decide to adop t it, or decide why it is that we reject it. 
12 r b · d  1 7 "> i . ,  P •  · -' • 
1 -:,  
- Jr n �act , Cha pman and Fite seem to d isagree with each other over 
ex2.ctly wha t  cons t i tutes "common sen se. " See Bibl iographic Essay . 
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summary. In this chapter, I have suggested that the arguments of 
John Jay Chapman and Warner Fite are worth examining , even if these 
arquments are not very usef u l  in  helping us to\ act . According l y, 
r have tried to illuminate some of the broad assumptions and impl i­
ca tions which are involved in arguing that P l ato is not worth study­
ing , and have tried to point to some of the assumptions one might 
make which would lead one to the opposite conclusion. 
S pecifically , I have arqued tha t the con�lusion made by Chapman 
and  �ite tha t Pl ato was less than perceptive rests, or at least 
seems to res t ,  on the assumptions that the average individual can , 
and, in fact ,  does know wha t  is "right" in politics, and that ideas 
which are not "right " cannot be learned from. I have gone on to 
sus0es t that th is implies that the pas t can only be used i� a l imited 
wa½ to positivel y reinforce our own ideas , and that the way to t he� 
way to the " good society" is through a ccepting those things we know 
froill ncornmon sense'' and not attempt ing to act from specul ative or 
te chnica l knowl edqe. Finally, I have argued that this approach is 
les s than useful because it fails to present a way in which we can 
chal lenge our assu�ptions. The next chapter will examine writers 
who have expl i cit l y  or implici tl y  rej ected the full thrus t of the 
a rcument made by Chapman and Fite -- those writers who have found 
it neces sary to examine whether Pl a to ' s  thought can be compared to 
our own. 
CHAPTER THREE :  CAN WE COMPARE PLATO ' S THOUGHT 
TO OUR OWN '? 
The title of this chapter is somewhat misleading. I t  impl ies 
that this chapter , like the las t, will deal with a simple "yes or 
no" sort of question. The is sue of "comparability" -- whether Pla to 
was really writing on the same sorts of  thing s which concern us, and 
whether we need ask that ques tion before reading the dialogues --
is  central to any understanding of what we can learn from Plato, and 
is  not a ques t ion which has generally received a s imple answer. I 
'12. ve en titled thi s  chapter , "can we compare Plato ' s  thought to our 
own �' because i t  is the one cen tral ques tion which concerns all 
t�e writers to be d iscussed here, and, because phrasing the ques tion 
t h is way makes it clear that it can be answered "no. " 
·)A � /  
Pla to lived in 4 th Century ,� thens; we read him in the industria-
l i zed world of the 20th Century. Pla to presented a specific view 
of the pos sibility of confl ict-free polit ics, and related this view 
to princi ples which governed the whole of human experience ; many 
w�o read the dialogues have accepted that politics is, by defini­
t ion, a world ; of confl ict and fl ux· .-- a world which is in some measure 
separa te from the princi ples which govern other fields. Applying 
P l a to to our ovm problems requires an act of "translation." In  thi s 
chapter ! will d iscuss the terms of that translation. Section� One 
will  d i scuss opinions on how the distance of time and circums tance 
�ond itions the way Plato can be viewed; Section Two will deal wi th 
how one ' s view of poli tics as a subject of discus s ion conditions 
analys is of Plato. 
(18) 
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Section One : Plato and Time 
Every writer who attempts to make a ny use of Plato's argument is 
confronted , almost immediately, with the difficulty of interpreting 
a wri ter who s poke a dif ferent language, at a dif ferent time, in a 
dif ferent culture. As long as these dif ferences remain, there will 
a l ways be a tradeoff between fidelity to P1ato's views, as he inten­
ded them to be understood, and fidelity to the need to find answers 
to the q uestions of a different cult lJre. The only way to avoid the 
d i stortion inevitable in in terpretation, and the trade-off inevitable 
in appl ica tion is  to avoid these two processes altogether -- to ac­
:�ept tha t we cannot make use of Plato at all. This section will 
d 5. scu ss  both the l .i.m itations and the advantages of the different 
ways in wh ich analysts have approached the problem of s temming the 
cr ap between P l ato • s time and our own. Here again, I hope to deter­
m ine how u seful these approaches are in helping us to understand how 
t o  ac t. - have found it helpful to group the analysts I will be 
discus sing based on their response to two • ques tions: 
? ir s t ,  ''is it  appropriate to try to derive useful ideas about 
po l itics from the writing of an individual who lived in a different 
t ir:,e and under di fferent circurhs tances ?". Writers who answer "no" 
to this question adopt the position that one cannot, or perhaps, 
s hould not look to the pas t for guidance. 
Second , is appropriate, are there any enduring characteris-
tics  of polit ical theory or the � .-poli ti cal experience which provide 
a bas is of comparison between the views of the pas t and our own?". 
1·.1 :- iters who ansNer "yes" to this question adopt the position that 
t here exis ts an objectively identifiable element in politics which 
transcends di f ferences in political environment. Writers who an-
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"no" to this question suggest that while concerns of politics may 
not be ob j ectively identifiable, one can relate more subj ective 
impress ion s about a writer • s  pos ition in his own age to our under­
standing o� him in our age. These three positions will be discussed 
separatel y ,  14 a long the same lines ·that I used when discussing the 
pos ition of C hapman anc Fite. 
1 )  We Canno t  Co Back. Wh ile many analysts have mentioned the 
d i ff icul ty of attempting to use Plato' s ideas to aid us in our own 
p�oblems , most have been w illing to brave this chal lenge. 15 A 
coherent theory sug9esting why the past cannot be used is presented, 
�owever , by A lban Dewes Winspear. As mentioned above, I wil l  dis­
c u s s  this view in t hree sections: first, I will examine what it is 
�� i nspear is saying, then, what this position implies about the way 
we ouo h t  to view the pas t,  and the way we ought to view politics, 
and f i na lly, how useful this · approach is in helping us to act in 
poli ti cs. 
�ha t is this arqument sayina? Wi nspear's argument is a combina­
t i on of two theories of historical development. The first, which 
· ht · t j ,l.. h  ·,.J e,-0., el, 16 t th t Pl t i one  r:1 1.r. 1 � a s soci a _.e w _ '"" ' 1 _ _ sugges s a a o s a repre-
sen tative of a primitive stage in the historical development of 
t�ou1ht. As such, whi le we may exam ine Pl�to to learn of our philo­
sophic roo t s, we ca nnot expect to find answers for our modern problems 
i n  the d ial ogues. 17 The second, which one might associate with Marx, 
111A lthouah some writers combine elements of two or all three of 
these approa ches, they are s till sufficiently distinct to be worth 
dis cussing separately. 
1 5 see for example , Ernest Barker, .!b!:, Political Thought of Plato 
a nd Aris totle (London : Me thuen C: Co. , 1906),  pp . 1-1 5. , Seediblio­
� ra phic E s say for more exampl es. 
1 r.::  __ , , �� ee Lectures on the H i s tora of Philosopht ' E.  s .  H a ld,ane · and  F�ances H. S i mson, tra'ns. , ( Lon on � Regan Pau , Tren ch, TrUbner ,?.: Co. , 
� td. , 1 894 ) , v. I I , pp. 9- 10. 
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suggests that the historical conditions which have controlled 
politics at least up until this point have made it impossible for 
any writer to venture even an honest attempt to rise above his own , 
narrow , partisan views. As such , Plato represented only the inter­
est s of a certain class during his  day , and not any enduring or 
transcendant ?! vision" of the political. 
'I'hus , l".ri nspear makes the assumption that politics and political 
t houg ht has followed a speci f ic line of historical development and 
conclude5 that Plato's thought was both primitive and partisan. 
½oreover, he suggests that Plato's political views were those of a 
"romantic conservative" a primitive among primitives. Winspear 
strongly obj ects to the approach Chapman and Fite use, because 
they suggest that Plato's argument is inadequate on its face, with­
ou t reference to the time in which Plato lived. Yet, Winspear's 
conclusion is not all that different from theirs -- Pl ato cannot 
help us to act in our modern world .  
Nhat does this position  implv? Like Chapman and Fite, Winspear 
makes a strong sta tement about the way we ought to view the past , 
a nd t�e way we oug ht to view politics. He suggests that we can 
on l y  understand the ideas of the past by learning of the historical 
condition s which led to these ideas, and that , once we understand 
t hese conditions, we will know why the past cannot be used to aid 
the  present. In other words, Winspear is suggest that "primit ive" 
thought is ob j ectively uninfluential, even if people have claimed 
to be influenced by it. 
1 7This ar9 ument is really better associated with Marxists than 
with �arx himself, althoug h  this sort of sentiment can be seen in 
some of : :arx's more drama t ic moments. See especially, Communist 
:<a nifesto 1 in Robert c .  Tucker, ed. :·,1arx-Engels Reader U,:ew York , 
'.'1 . \·l. t.Jorton t} Co.,  Inc. 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 3 4 9. 
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:-- :oreover , Td inspear implies that we must interpret the writing 
of the past so that i t  "f i ts 1 � our knowledge of the historical back­
ground of the author. If, for example, we know that Pl ato was an 
aristocrat, and f ind that he made a comment in one of the dialogues 
wh ich woul d seem to damage the aristrocratic cause, Winspear suggests 
that we must interpret the comment as a subtle political ploy. Thus, 
wha t Plato ( allegedly ) meant, is more important than what he said. 
A f inal important implication of W inspear's approach on how we 
ought to view the past is that one cannot really determine whether 
an idea of  the pas t  is " good" or "bad. " If all ideas stem from 
parti san pos i tions on issues which are out of date, it is d i fficult 
to see how one can say that one or ano ther viewpoint on any such 
is sue had the more "wor thy" claim. Winspear him9e·.i f ;  - however, .� does 
18 seem to make this sort of judgement about Plato ' s  argument. 
Wins pea r's position also implies a very specific view of  pol itics. 
:r t  su·g0es ts that there is no such thing as a pol itical "vision" and 
that anyone who claims to recognize some transcendent view of  the 
rood i s  merel y  a d ishones t political partisan. This view appl ies 
no t only to Plato, but to any modern anal yst who disagrees with 
Winspear' s arg ument. This  position resembles that of  Chapman and 
? ite i n  the sense that it sugges ts that there is some "correct" under­
s ta nd i ng abou t the way society operates and implies that if one were 
really percepti ve one wou ld recognize this fact. Where Winspear 
d iffers from the other two wri ters is that he believes that the 
" correct" understanding is  that bel iefs in moral standards are 
18
r bel ieve that W inspear is  inconsistent in sugae$tihg that Plato's "aristocrat ic" position is les s worthy than the pos it.ion of Plato's opponents. A simil ar· · problem i s  Winspear's suggestion that Plato ' s  meth?,ds w7re , presumably in some "objective" way, devious. See � �en;s is of  Plato ' s  Thouqht { New York: Dryden Press, 1940 ) ,  esp. pp. 1 ·:l-80. 
\.,,: 
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dependen t on historical circumstances. He would suggest that what 
Chapman and Fite call "truths " are merely tra nsitory manifes tations 
of class in terest. Moreover, Winspear believes that the "correct" 
view of polit ics is not one which is evident to the average indi­
vidual, or even the average theorist. 19 Thus, far from representing 
an ti-in tellectualism, Winspear is actually something of an intellectual 
elitis t. 
How useful is this approach? It goes without saying that the 
assumptions Winspear makes about politics and political thought 
d iffer a great deal from my own. Yet his approach is usef�l in a 
way that Chapman and Fite's is not , because he sets out the assump­
t ions he makes. As I will discuss in Chapter Five, I can determine 
why it is I d isagree with Winspear, and as I have already discussed, 
I can tes t Winspear's argument against his assumptions and suggest 
t hat  �e is not  always consistent. 
':lh i le thi s  complemen t may seem left-handed, it is really a tri­
bute to a certain amoun t of intellectual honesty in Winspear ' s  
approach. He points to the sorts of ass umptions we may have to make 
abou t the  past if we are to use it ; he suggests that if we are to 
th i nk of ourselves as bei ng in some higher stage of development, we 
�us � not expect to look back for guidance . If we are to make use of 
t he past, we must either show why this argument is wrong, or 
accept tha t  in some significant way, we have not changed very much 
in 2 500 years. I will now examine the views of some analysts who 
take the latter position .  
2 )  There are endur i na elements in politics. Writers who suggest 
that  there is �El characteristic about political thought or the 
�o l i t i ca l  expe � ience itself which can be understood without regard 
1 9 �  n " b l "  h " -ee 01 iograp 1c �ssay. 
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the environment of political theorists take a position which is 
almost diametrically opposed to Winspear's. One basis for this 
positi on i s  the belief that all pol itical thinkers can be d iscussed 
and class ified according to their relation to some central under-
. s tariding about politics -- e. g. whether they are advocates of the 
"open society" or the "cl osed society. " A second approach stems 
from the belief that all political thinkers have had to deal with 
certain narrow , yet persistent, questions -- e. g. on what basis can 
one determine that the g overnance of the state is l egitimate. A 
third position of this sort involves the understand ing that pol itics 
ent a il s  a certain commonality of experience which, itself, provides a 
basis of comparison between d ifferent ages -- e. g. that politics . 
has always involved decision-mak ing based on the principles which 
a society believes to be important. Each of these wil l be d iscussed, 
i n  tur.n. 
a )  Class ification Accord ina to Central Understandina. The notion 
t h a t  t here is s ome central principle which can be used to classify 
all polit ical theorists is exemplified in the writing of Karl Popper. 
Wh il e he has not been the only analyst to approach the past this way, 20 
hi s p�esentation on this poi�t is particul arly clear. 
�ha t  is this araument saying? Popper suggests that Plato, along 
wit h  Rous s eau, Hegel, I'-'1arx and H itler, was on the "wrong" side of a 
continuou s s trugqle between the forces of the ttclosed society" 
the advoca tes of totalitarianism -- and those of the ' 'open society" 
-- the advocates of liberal democracy. P opper believes that we must 
s t udy Plato so that we may learn to identify the views of politics 
wh i c� l ea d  t o  t o talitarianism , wherever they may be found. Popp�r ' s  
?O?or a di scuss ion of some of the other writers who approach Plato 
this way, see Chapter Four. 
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argumen t abou t what these views are will be discus sed in the next 
chapter. Here , I will examine the assumptions about political 
a n a l ys i s  wh ich lead Popper to take thi s view of the pas t. 
Popper makes  t he assumpt ion that politics has been characterized 
by t he continuous strugg l e  he describe s -- that, at least since the 
th�e of tribal cultures, there have been elements of "repres sion" 
and element s o f  "freedom" in all societies. Moreover, he assumes 
that these elements can be observed and easily identified. �ccording 
to  P opper, we can recognize the same principles in Plato's views of 
pol itics t �at we find in Hitler ' s; we can see that Plato advocated 
po l icies which lim it the freedom of the common man, and know that 
� i1ese policies meant the same thing in 4 t h  Century Athens, a s  they 
do in our modern po l itical world. Winspear would disagree with Pop­
per's ass umptions that struggles over these sorts of principles ever 
take place. Other differing assumptions will be examined when other 
a pproaches to Plato  are examined. 
�ha t  does th i s  approach imply? As one might expect, Popper implies 
a view of ._ the tjast, ·which is c!ilmost directly' :opposed ... tb that presented 
by '.1 i nspear. Popper suggests that a writer can rightly be categorized 
according to his/her views with virtually no reference to his/her his­
to i cal circum stances. This is to say that a writer can correctly be 
l j_ nked to the .' i�plication s which h i s / her thinking has tended to lead 
to , even if the writer never know of these implications. Thus, Pl�to 
our:". h t  to be called a "totalitar ian" even if he did not know what the 
word " totali -1:arian" meant. 
�hat Popper shares with Winspear, Chapman and Fite is the belief 
t h a t  it is important to decide what Plato ought to be "called" --
5 . •  e. t�a t the pa st o�gh t  to be j udqed. While for Win spear this 
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entails judging a thinker ' s  background, for Popper, Chapman and Fite 
this entails determining whether a thi.nker' s ideas were "right" or 
"wrong. " \:J here Popper really differs from the other analysts is 
in suggesting that it may be useful to discuss a thinker even if 
our j udgemen t about him/her is a negative one . For Popper, the 
thought of the past, and even "wrong"  ·: .thought, has been inf luential 
and must be understood. 
'�his approach leads Popper to view politics as a relatively sim­
ple process . He believes that the major polit ical issues are very 
c l ear  cut, an d therefore that our pol itical choices are fairly straight­
f" 0 r�:'0 ; (1 . 1 -.t'1 i l e  it may take  a <:;ood deal of insight to determine the 
ex2. c t  standards on which political thought 1ought to be judged, once 
we !:now what these standards ar� the process of testing, categorizing 
and decidinq between views is relatively easy. For Popper, th� good 
l i fe l ies in decid ing what our decisions mean, and then making them . 
: Jow u seful is this aooroach? Popper makes a l arge tradeoff. He 
i s  � · r 5.llin? to accept that  there is no import'ant difference between 
P l v to's view of politics and Hitler's, and, as a result, must be 
wil l i n� to  accept t ha t  his interpretation of Plato wil l be less than 
f a ith f ul to Pla to ' s  intentions. His approach is limited to isolating 
wa ys  in which the past is very s imilar to the present, and is not 
very usefu l in understandinq how the past differs from the present. 
· · o r-eo � -e r. , Popper's approach is limited to using the pas t to find 
a n swers which are very simple and clear cut , and not to help us in 
more complex is sues. 
I f  one agrees with Popper , and bel ieves that politics has not 
chan0ed very significantl y and is rel atively simple , then these 
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limitat ions are not very significant. It is therefore understand­
able that, while Popper is fairly conscious of the assumptions he 
makes, he is not aware of the ways in which his approach �ay be 
limi ted. Popper believes that he has described vir tually  all one 
need s to know abou t approaching politi cs, and that a d ifferent 
approach cannot provide any add itional useful informat ion. 
The dif ficu l ty is that i f  one disagrees with P opper's view of 
pol itics 1 one is apt to decide that his approach is not very useful. 
I f  one believes , a s  I do , that political questions are very complex, 
t hen Popper ' s argument is weak i n  part because it only illumi nates 
a l ittle of wha t we need to know , and primarily because it does not 
?dmi t of the possibility of using quite a few different approaches 
to help illum i nate other things about politics. Thus, by fail ing to 
recog nize the l i mitations in his approach, Popper makes it very dif­
f i cult for anyone who disagrees with his argument to make use of it. 
b )  Comoar ison by Answers to Persistent Questions. Writers who 
at tempt  to find Plato's answers to certai n  narrow questions which 
have continually con fronted theorists are less concerned than Popper 
i s  about clas s if ying Pla to  i nto a broad scheme of thought. Whereas 
Popper t r ies to  find whether Pla to "bel ieves in A or i n  B, " these 
a n a l y s 4.:s co1..:ld t l1eir ques t ions in  terms like "on what bas is did Plato 
try to secure �,oal A , " or 1 1 how would Plato say that we could tell 
when �oa l  7 has  been secured. '' Popper attempts to del imit politics, 
by a s s uming that the answers to political questi ons remain the same 
over t ime , these anal ysts attempt only  to del imit a specific fiel d  
o f  inquiry by examining the myriad o f  answers which way have been 
of fered to one of many important political questions. Writers who 
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u se this approach include John T. Bookman and Charles Howard Mcil -
wa in. 
What is this approach saying? It is not necessary to describe 
t he speci fic questions Bookman and Mci lwain discuss, to gain an under­
s ta nd of what their approach involves. 2 1  At first glance their 
ass umptions s eem similar to Popper ' s. Like Popper, Bookman and 
� �ci lwain assume that there is a general continuity to political 
thought -- that the issues which we believe to be important are 
t he same ones which Plato believe to be important . Unlike Popper, 
�owever , Bookman and Mci lwain assume that answers to pol itical 
ques tions are not cl ear cut -- that there are many shades of dif­
ference among  t hinkers. Also unlike Popper, Bookman and , to some 
'J ? 
extent : 1 ci lwal n,, . . .  as sume that their approach is neither perfectly 
a ccurate, nor absolutely definitive, and admit that their may be 
other useful ways of a pproaching Plato. 
What does this approach imply? Like Popper, and unlike Winspear, 
Bookman and 1 �cilwai n i�ply that we can properly understand thinkers 
wi t�out reference to their historical circumstances, or, at least, 
t h a t  t here is somethin9 to be gained throµgh viewing thinkers this 
2 3  
\•.,ra �' . Unlike the arguments d iscussed thus far , this approach im-
pl ies t �a t  it is not necessary to " j udge" the past , but merely that 
one o·.10.::t to use  the pas t  for whGtever guidance it can provide. 
'."1 00'-� man, in particu lar, looks to Plato for a formu lation about how 
2 1Gookman deals with the question of whether dissent or disobedience 
to  l aw can be j us ti fied; r�cilwain is concerned with what makes the 
s tate legit imate. 
� ?  
� LMci lwain tend s to think of the question he discusses as the 
" cen tral " issue which has concerned political theorists, and attempts 
to develop a view of a "tradition" of thought. Yet he is quite con­
s ci ous tha t he cannot hope to relate P lato ' s  meaning precisely, and 
seems to admit of the possibility that there may be other relevant 
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to approach a subject, rather than a "correct" answer. Accordingly , 
while Bookman and Mci lwain do see a continuity between the political 
thought df :d i f ferent times ,  they do not imply that Plato ought to be 
l inked to the imp U.cations of arguments which post-date him, at least 
in the way Popper does. 2 4 I n gener� l , these analysts try to deter­
m i ne whether what P lato said can be useful to us , rather than what 
l abel we shou ld app ly to P lato. 
r:,h ese writers imply tha.t .politics is real ly a fairly complex pro­
cess. �here is no j ust one, but many rel evant questions, and not 
j u s t  �:h'O , bu.t.m2ny plausible answers to each question. OQ the other 
hand , 3ookma n , and especial ly Mc i lwai� suggest that the questions 
w� i ch need an swers are apparen t, and have a lways been the same. 
" ' :1ey ir:1p l y  t hat we can try to make sense of our politica l world, by 
exani n ing the answers of those who have faced these questions before us. 
· :m·.' u s eful is  th ls approach,· Here again, there is a tradeoff 
�e���en a ttemptins to answer modern questions, and attempting to 
be fa ith!ul  to P la to' s intentions. This approach is limited because 
it inevitably lead s to a certain amount of distortion in the account 
of P l ato ' s views , and neg lects the extent to which different poli­
t i ca l  envi ronments have led thinkers to ask different questions about 
nol i t i cs. Yet thi s approach is usef u l  in a way that��ppper ' s  is not 
because neit her Bookman nor Mci lwain make claims to represent the 
so l e  usef1· l  way of interpreting Plato, and both are aware of the 
q :.!est ions. See ':'he C�rowth of Political Thouaht in the � ( New York: 
·.··· �1e ; :ac'- : i l lan Company, 193 2 ) ,  especial ly, pp. 1, 22 .  
? �  
· - ·  ... I·'ici lwain does provide a brief bioqraphy of P lato, but does so 
more wi th the inten tion of providing a history of political thinkers , 
t �a n  with the i ntention of applying this background to his interpreta­
t : on. 
? t  ' - · : jc::C lwain' s view o f  a development of thought may involve . -. :some 
l i nking of arg umen ts anachronistical ly , but not in the sense of 
l a beling Plato with a 2 0th Century term. 
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limitations to their argumen t, at least to some extent . As such, 
one need to accept their view of the continuity of political 
ques tions to make use of their approach. 
c ) commonality of Political Exeerience. The third type of "en­
during element ' ' in pol i t±cs differs significantl y  from the other 
two in tha t  it sugges ts that political experiences, and not politi­
cal ideas, are wha t form the basis of comparison between thinkers 
of differen t ages. A writer who uses this approach need that hold 
that the political experience of the Greeks is irrelevant to an 
unders tanding or a ppreciation of Plato, but merely that Plato ' s  
environmen t was sufficiently similar to our own that one need not 
ex2mine  tha t envi ronment in depth to learn how his message can be 
appl ied to our own experiences. This type of approach can be 
s een  explici t l y  in the writing of Prosser Hall Frye, Roger Chance and 
-- : ul ford Q. Sibley , and implicitly in the writing of G .  Lowes Dickinson. 
: ,;hat is this approach sayinq ? Here ag ,d.n, the specific sorts of 
elemen t s  in t he poli tical experience each writer refers to need not 
be examined. The important assumption each of these writers make 
is that some elements of the political environment are important 
enough to form a basis of comparison between d ifferent ages , even 
thoug h other a�pects of the poli tical experience may differ a great 
dea l. �oreover, these writers assume that our understanding of the 
pa st need not be systematic -- that we do not have to draw lines of 
continu i t y  in though t  to make sense of political ideas . Finally, 
t ;1ese writers 2.ss:ume that ' .. what ma·kes a ip9litica·1 question important 
i s  � he �act that it interes ts us, and no t that it has objectively 
d i �r ided pol i tical thoug ht 0r has persis tently interested thinkers 
across the ages. � 
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What does this approach imply? None of the writers who argue 
tha t a commonality of experience provides a basis of comparison 
between Plato' s thoug ht and our own maintain that this is the onlx 
' h t k h . 2 5  way in which we can ope o ma e sue a comparison. It is help-
f ul, however, to examine what such an extreme position would imply, 
so that one can assess what it means to combine thi s rapproach with 
elements of either or both of the last two. 
I f  one maintains that a commonality of experience is the only 
basis of comparison between our views and Plato's, one is suggesting 
tha t the bod y of political ideas � not coherent enough to allow for 
such a comparison. The implications of this position entails some 
of t he impl icat ions of each of t he approaches discussed thus far. 
L .Hce the a r.<:-; umen ts of Popper, Bookman and Mcilwain, this position 
s : wf'es !· s  t h a t  we can ric:htly interpret Plato's ideas without mo�e 
t�a n a cursory reference to the times in which he lived. Like Win­
spear' s approach , this position suggests that the ideas of . 'the .. . past 
need not be in& l uential on later generations, and that the ideas 
w� ich are appropriate may change over time. Like F ite and Chapman ' s  
a r.,, umen t , t h is position implies that one ought to assess a thinker' s 
idea s to  determine whether they are sufficiently insightf ul to help 
t1 s , and su00ests that certain thinkers may not be worth studying , 
w� i l e  ot �ers may be usef ul. Thus , if one suggests that the ideas 
of the past are not related coherently, one implies that stray ideas 
may be i�portant , but only when they seem useful. 
S imilarly, this position allows for the pos�i�ility that politics, 
i � self , i s  a f a i rly incoherent , and incredibly complex process, which 
can only be identified by the activities which characterize it. This 
pos ition accep t s  tha t nei t her the answers thinkers have given, nor 
? S  
· - -- see B ib liographic Essay. 
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even t he que s tion s thinkers have raised, help us to understand what 
pol i tics itself is. Under such a perspective, · we can, at best, on ly 
hope to ma k:e sen se of our immedi ate problems , and not to unders tand 
t he sys tem in wh i ch our action takes place. 
�ow u s ef ul i s  t h is approach? This  position is t he most flexible 
of the three j us t  discus sed in helping us to analyze the way in 
wh i ch po litical ideas have differed over time. The differences this 
approach tends to overlook are those between our political experience 
and the Greek polis . Yet , used alone , this approach is very unsatis­
fyins  to  one who holds my perspective, for it helps us to understand 
on l y  a small part of our political experience. I have tried to sug­
,,es t ,  tha t i f  one holds , as I do, that politics is somewhat coherent, 
and t �iat i dea s underlie political action, 2 6 we cannot look at poli­
t i cs in this way alone. We must either do as the writers mentioned 
here do , and comb ine an argument that there is a commonality of poli­
t i cnl experience, with a perspective which suggests that ideas also 
�a k e  sen s e , or we must approach the past very differently . 
su�ma rv. I have just d isc�:�ssed three approaches which suggest 
that there is some enduring element in politica l _ fd�as 9r· thecpblitical 
experience which can be used as a bas is of comparison between Plato ' s  
thouo ht and our own. I have suggested that each of these approaches 
illumina tes  a part of what we would l ike to know about politics ,  but 
t ha �  none of these are complete in themselves. In the last part of 
J,.. .  sec .... ion 1 I will discuss some analys ts who try to make use of  
t�e pa s t  i n  a different · way. 
- -2 6r t  one  is a s trict empiricist, the idea that political thought 
h i s  not be�n very coherent is not much of a problem. None of the 
· 2-n-a l ':' s t s r.ien t toned here , however , approach politics this way. See 
d i  s c1 .1 s s 1o n  l n Chapter Five. 
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3) Rela t inq >Tore Sub i ecti ve Impres s ions. It is poss ible to agree 
with �Jinspear to a point , and yet d isagree with h i s  conclusions . 
several analys ts have argued that to understand Pl ato , we must under­
stand h i s t imes, and yet have tried to extract useful mes sag es from 
P la to's wri t i ng. One way of doing this ha s been to attempt to j udge 
Pla to by the standards of his own time, and not by our standards. A 
second approach has been to use Plato's environment to help illumi­
na te  wha t he "really meant" and then compare his meaning to our own 
ideas. 30th of these will be discussion , in turn. 
a )  E�alua t i na P l ato bv the Standards of His T ime . Writers who 
use t� i s  a pproach crea te an analogy. These suggest that, if we can 
l earn  how Pla to's thought wa s related to the thought of his time, we 
can unders tand wha t  a thinker l ike Pl ato might look like in our 
envi ronmen t. E xamples of th is sort of pos ition can be seen in the 
wr i t ina of Eric Havelock , G. c. F ield, and Wetner Jaeger. 
; 'Jhu t i s  t h i s  arproach sayinr;<'. Analysts who approach Plato thi s  
w2y sw;gc�s t that we ca n learn v,hat Pl ato meant by examining his 
environmen t, or a t  l ea s t  tha t an ins ight into Pl a to ' s environment 
i s  �ore helpful t han harmful in understanding h is meaning, and 
co :·1 !10.r i. n '"· : 1 i s  be l i ef to our own. 27 �· .. Joreover, these analysts as sume 
tha t  the relat ion s h ip between a th inker and his political environ-
Den � corres pond s  to a rel ations hip we can recognize. Finally, they 
2 s s �J:-.1e, in con tra s t  to Popper , tha t  a _, principle. or pol icy .. · advo� 
cated i i ,  � l a t o ' s environmen t ,  d i<l · not necessary mean the same then, 
t ha t  i t  does  today. 
� ,-:  
� 
1 E ach of these  wri t ers holds different pos it ions on what type 
o�  eviden ce ourht to be accepted as an ins ight into Plato' s  motives 
how fa r one can ri� h tly go in in ferring Pl a to's dispos ition int; a nd 
his • , .... 1· t ·i nr (' e · ,., · · 1 · · h · 1·"' : . .._ .  - - . . • .:) e .. :· l J.J 1 ,·.,� rap, 1c . .:.ss ay. 
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�ha t does th is approach imply? T his position imp lies a great 
deal about our view of the past. It suggests that the things a 
writer tr ied to achieve l imits the extent to which we can use his 
ars ument. Accordingly, if P l ato did not intend to make a statement 
about ob l ig a tion , it i s  incorrect , and inappropriate to attempt 
to in fer what his s tatement on the subject might  be. This approach 
puts  so�e sor t of va l ue on knowing what kind of person Plato was. 
I f  ? l a to were an unscrupulous politician ,  or an ind igent , he sho�ld 
be understood differently than he is �ow , given what we know of his 
:x� ckgrc : : n d. This idea of understanding Plato in light of wha t  we 
1(now about him is s im ilar, although not quite so systemati� as the 
t ype of interpretation suggested by Winspear � (see note 2 7 ) .  Fina lly, 
w� i le thi s  view tends to suggest that we ought not to judge the past 
_1Jy our s tandards, it does may a definite statement about what sorts 
of ideas are useful. The ideas which are useful are those which are 
i n terpreted a s  accurately as possible, and not those which are extra­
polU· �-.. d from the writing of the past. 
Thi s  pos ition implies somewhat less about how one mig ht view 
polit ics. The type of view is seems to suggest is one which l ikens 
t he s t ud y  of politica l  ideas, to the s tudy of history, or perhaps 
2 8  
cu lt�r�l anthropology .  I t  does not suggest, as Winspear' s approach 
does , t ha t po l i t i ca l  thought has followed a specific line of develop­
�ent , but merely that the though t  of one time has been related to 
another. T hi s  position i mp l ies that ideas are not j ust useful in 
c:nd :; f  t�1em sel  ves , but that they become useful when we can know where, 
� i s torical l y, t hese ideas came from �- much the way one might suggest  
that it  i s  usef ul to  knov,r . exactl y wha t  happened in  the Peloponnesian 
�ar if we are to under stand military h istory. 
? 0  
- - 7hi s i s  es pecia lly true of Jaeger , See Bibliographic essay. 
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How usefu l  is this approach? The analysts who argue in this way 
tradeoff in the opposite direction from those who seek to make com­
parisons on the basis of "enduring elements"; writers who seek to 
be fa ithf ul to Plato' s intentions must, of necessity, be less than 
faithful to modern concerns. Moreover, even the attempt to inter­
pret accurately is doomed to a certain amount of failure. Each of 
these analysts has preconceived notions of what thought is important 
to look from when examining Plato, and each must base an intepretat ion 
on ev idence which is inevitably spotty. 
Yet, one must not equate faithfulness to our modern concerns with 
"usefulness. " While it may be useful to attempt to extract a wide 
ranoe of ideas f rom P lato, even from m isconceptions of what he said, 
t here are some ideas which we will only learn if we attempt to be 
fai thful to Plato' s intentions. We gain a different insight into 
wha t i t  means to suggest that poets ought to be censored, for example, 
when we try to discover why Plato made that suggest ion. 29 The attempt 
to be accurate may provide a different insight, even if that attempt 
can never succeed perfectly. Here ag ain, the primary question is 
whether one appcoach precludes us from taking advantage of others. 
b )  E valua tinq by Our Standards. Analysts who uz. this approach 
attempt to combine elements of other approaches. Like the approach 
j u s t  discussed , this position involves an examination of the thinker's 
environment to try to find out as much about what he/she meant as 
pos sible. L i ke the approaches invo l ving "enduring elements, " this 
pos ition suggests that we cannot free ourselves from our preconceived 
not ions about what is correct in politics. As a result, these wri-
2 9compare, for example, Havelock' s argument on this point with 
Popper' s or Bertrand Russell' s .  See Bibliographic Essay. 
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ter s argue that ..,,,e must evaluate the thinker by what � believe to 
be correct. Examples of this sort of argument can be seen in works 
by Alvin Gouldner , Ernest 3arker and others. 
What is thi s approach sa. ing? Gouldner and Barker, like the 
a nalysts who use the previous approach, assume that it is more help­
fi:� 1 tha:h harmfu l  to interpret a thinker by examining the environment 
in which he/ s he wrote. Where these analysts d iffer is in assuming 
tha t  Plato  can rightly be assessed by relating his v iews to our own, 
a nd i n  a s s uming tha �  the important political questions are those we 
1 1 elicve to be impor tant. These assumptions resemble those made by 
: _ _ �.oo:.: ::v2. n ,  >1ci l t:ra in , :�' rye and Chance. 
What does  th i s  view imply? Not surpris ingly, the view of the past 
iraplied by t his posit ion is quite complex. Gouldner and Barker sug­
gest tha t learning about a thinker's environment helps us to under­
s t n nd wha t  h i s/her ideas meant, but does not justify a thinker for 
�2 1/ i n r certain ideas. I f  Plato was an apologist for s lavery , he was 
"�:,'rong ·1 " even if  we know why it was that he did not argue otherwise. 
S i nce t�e s e  writers sug gest that our standards are a lready ad�quate , 
t �:ey Lnp l  y tha t  what we can learn from the past are not "new ideas , "  
�u t ra ther ins i�hts i nto why thinker' s held ideas wh ich were inade­
qua te. I t  i s  iraportant, therefore, to determine whether an idea 
o :- t :1 e  pa s t  i s  adequate or not. 
0 .:':: e v iew of politics this implies is  a fairly simple one. We 
know , to  a lar0e extent, what the correct unders tandings about 
pol i t i cs are, but tan g ain from finding out why people have held 
c� L�ferently. ':'..' he fact that individuals , · have held differently is , 
3 0  
5_ n ouldner ' s word s " discomfi tting , f f  but we must not try to apologize 
for. ideas we disagree with. The way to the "good life" is in under­
s t;.:rnding why we hold the ideas we do. 
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1 10w useful is th is approach? This position has some of the ad­
va n ta�es and  some of the limitations of other approache s discus sed .  
I t  helps to provide an insight into why Plato held the views he did, 
and a l to allows use to extrapolate a b it to view Plato in ways which 
seem appropriate to us. On the other hand, it limits the way in 
wh ich the pa s t  can be used, and neglects the pos sib ility that Plato ' s  
t �ought may not be entirely comparable to our own. Moreover, Gouldner 
and Jarker s eem more concerned with judg ing Plato, than with applying 
? l 2 to ' s  ideas to our own problems. Thus , while their approach is 
i n terestinc, and perhaps un iquely useful in gaining certa in  insights 
\ . 
wh i ch no one other approach provides, it is al so unusually limited • 
. �.; ;. 1mrnary. In thi s  s ection, I have discussed various ways in which 
wr i ters  have approached the problem of s temming the gap of time be­
t ween � l a L o ' s e n v ironmen t and our own. Specifical ly, I have d iscussed 
A l �an Dewes �in s pear's argument that the ideas of different times 
ca nnot be compared , three different approaches which suggest that 
s�ch a comparison can be made on the bas is of certain ''enduring ele­
rien t s 1 1  in pol itics 1 and two approaches which suggest that one can 
t ake time into accoun t in interpreting and evaluating the views of 
t �e pa s t. �ha t I have tried to make cl ear are two points: first, 
t ha t  t he way we view t he pas t  means someth ing -- that the as sump­
t i ons  we make when we approach Plato af fect the concl usions we reach 
a 1)ou t politics; and , second , that every appro'ach to the past is made 
at  a cos t ,  and that t he most adequate approaches  are those that re­
cog nize that cos t ,  and allow for the possibility that ; · other approaches 
�a�  �e u s e f u l. �he second section of this chapter will d iscuss  a 
s o�ewha t di� ferent problem which arises in comparing Plato's ideas 
t o  our O\vn . 
30Q ee s ··bl  · h '  .. ' Ir'"  . . e . !l. il. Ograp 1.c .. �.ssay. : · , · 
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section Two :  Pl ato and Politics 
Time is not the only possibl e barrier between our political 
questions and Plato ' s  assistance in ans�ering them. Some analysts 
have sugg ests that, while we may be able to compare the thought of 
the past to our own, the extent to which we can extract a useable 
statement about politics from Plato ' s  dialogues is limited. This 
argument has gen erally taken one of two , somewhat related, forms . 
The  first is the view that the use we �an make of Plato ' s  thought 
to help us in politics is limited because Plato was not a political 
t �1 inker at al 1. '"�he second is the view that ·!: he  use we can make of 
Pla to is limited because Pl ato's view of politics is fundamentally 
d ifferent from ours. These will be discussed separately . 
1 )  Plato as an Apolitical � "'hinker. This argument has been mad e  
i n  a fairly extreme form by F. E .  Sparshott and Sheldon Wolin, and 
somewhat less vehemently by Ernest Barker arid Wayne A .  R. Leys. 
Several other writers have hinted at this sort of argument. 31 Here 
a9 ain, it is useful to beg in with a description of what this posi­
tion entail s. 
· 1hat does this position entail ? All of the writers mentioned 
above are concerned with defining the disciple of "politi cs. " They 
suc,9est tha t  "politics" shoul d be understood as the study of how 
socie t y  comes to find compromises among conflicting viewpoints where 
an appeal to knowledge is not possible -- where no viewpoint is 
"truer" than another. They go on to argue that Pl ato, rather than 
helping us  to understand how these compromises take place, tried 
to elioinate compromise and conflict altogether, and, as such was 
" a- H or " anti-political. " 
3 1roger Ch ance , I. M. Crombi e ,  Alvin Goul dner and others m�ke he­
ferences · to: __ this - sort ·· of  ; v:iew. J. See -. , �ib� iographic . Essay. 
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All of these writers make an assumption about knowledge -- that 
there are, indeed , decisions which cannot be based upon knowledge, 
a nd that it is useful to have a discipline to deal with these is sues. 
: ioreover, each makes an assumption about what const.i tutes "pol l tical 
thou9ht. " Each of these analysts, with the exq�ption of Sparshott, 
assume that a "poli tical thinker" is one who helps to describe "po­
litics , "  as opposed to one who hel ps us to act in politics. Shar­
s hott  goes even further to assume that it is only those thinkers 
who describe politics who can possibly help us to act in politics. 
F inally, each assume, or perhaps more accurately, interpret Plato 
to arg� Je that " pol i tics " ought to be eliminated. 
To unders tand what these assumptions mean , it is helpful to examine 
the basis on which each of them might be disagreed with. First, one 
D i g h t  have a conf lic ting view of knowledge. One might believe that 
a l l  decisions can , indeed, be based upon knowledge, and that knowledge 
ou:7 ht to order political decisions. This view has been expressed by 
Leo S traus s and others. 
Second, one mig ht differ with the view of "political thought." 
One might s ugges t, as Popper, Winspear, Fite an others have, that 
a thinker ou9ht to be called "political" if that individual acts in 
poli tics, or makes arguments which have implications on how we might 
a c t  in poli tics. One might also suggest, as John Wild , and some 
a n a l ysts  of American politics have, 32 tha t  much of what could be 
ca l led "poli tical though t" involves attempts to avoid conflict. 
�hese analysts argue that it is not very useful to consider all 
theory which s trives toward conciliation, as well as much of natural 
law tht� t""ry to be "a pol i tica 1. " 
3 ? � �1os t importantly Daniel Boorstin and Louis Hartz. 
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Finally, one might disagree with the interpretation of Plato. 
Glenn R. r_;7orrow argues, for example, that the � was an attempt 
a t  a mixed constitution -- one which balances the interests of 
3 3  various classes against each other. Allan Bloom and others have 
argued that Plato presented a view of conflict when he depicted 
the philosopher's return to the cave in the ReQublic. 34  Both of 
these suqgest that Plato might well be called a "political" thinker. 
What are the implications of this position? Each of these 
opposing assumptions are helpful in illuminating implications 
about the view of Plato as an "apolitical " thinker. First, the 
view of k nowledge suggests that there are real limits to what we 
can know about the correct way to act. All the analysts who make 
this arg ument suggest that politics cannot be ordered so as to 
ach ieve 't:,erfection ." Second, the assumption about "political though 1!" 
s u00ests tha t  the applicability of a thinker's ideas to our problems 
is limited if he did not describe or analyze conflict. Sparshott 
implies that a thinker who attempts to transcend conflict is of 
no use to us a t  all in politics , -- that it is not helpful to see 
what it  is to have a "vision" of a perfect system. The other analysts, 
especiall y  1.\Tolin, suggest that an "apolitical view" may still have 
pol itical implications. Finally, the interpretation of Plato , sug­
cests that our application of the past must be selective, based 
on the way in wh ich we interpret each thinker ' s  ideas; to these 
analysts Plato is not as useful as some other thinkers such as 
Aristotle -- might �e. 
3 3see B ibl iographic Essay. 
3 4Th is i s  not to suggest that Bloom would agree with the view 
that poiitics ought to be defined as the study of conflict. I am 
us ing Bloom merel y as an example of how one might construct a case 
for the argument that Plato tried to analyze conflict. 
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How useful is this position? As with the approaches of Chapman� 
�i te and Winspear, my difficulty with this argument comes over i ts 
basic assumptions. Specif ically , I take exception to the assump­
tion about what ought to cons titute "political thought . "  I believe 
t hat, wh :0 .le it may be appropriate to think of " politics" as the 
s tudy of the way in which questions of value, as opposed to ques-
tions of " f act" are disposed of , · individual act ion in politics 
i nvolves a certain sort of knowledge. The knowledge which is im­
portant is knowledge of why we look at politics in the way we do, 
and not necessarily why politics takes place in the way it does. 
� do not believe that it is very useful to think of all writers 
who sought to a void conflict -- not only P1ato , but also Locke , 
Rousseau ,  and even f:iarx , in his vision of the communis t state -- as 
"apolitical." 
Yet, l i k e  Winspear ' s approach, this position is useful because 
it can help one to challenge one ' s assumptions. Sparshott, and 
especially Wolin , fbrce us to decide how we are to look at politics, 
2 nd to beq in de termin.:.ng what views can possibly help us to act 
po litically. It is important to delimit the field that one is 
d i scuss ing , and these analysts are usef ul for helping us to do that. 
2) Pla to and a D ifferent Concept of Politics. Another perspec­
t i ve ,  best associated with David G rene, examines Pla to's idea of 
"poli tics" and reaches a conclusion which Gouldner did not that 
Plato's conception cannot be compared to our own . Grene ' s  view of 
what our conception of politics is, however, differs a great deal 
from Sparshott ' s  or Wolin ' s. 
What is this position sayino? Grene argues that to unders tand 
P l �to's political views we must recognize that they were presented as 
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a part of a unified philosophic whole, and th�t we cannot take 
Plato's political ideas out of context. Since we tend to think of 
politics as, at least to some extent, analytical ).y dis tinct from 
o ther fields, we cannot possibly compare Plato's ideas to our own. 
Grene does not make an assumption about the "true" nature of 
� :nowledge ,  but rather about the possibility that the field which 
we call " p,'.)li tics" may not be one which all thinkers have recognized. 
He assumes that we delimit this field according to the type of 
thinking which characterizes it, rather than the type of action 
wh ich is associated with it. In  this he differs from writers like 
Frye, Chan ce and Dickinson. He also assumes that we mus t be true 
to the context of a thinker's ideas -- in this he dif fers from all 
o�:= the analysts who make use of "enduring elements. " Finally, 
he makes a specific interpretation of Plato's tb ousht -- one which 
di ffers from the interpretation writers like Sparshott  and Wolin 
make. 
Wha t does this position imply? Like the arguments of Wolin and 
Spa rshott, Grene's pos ition implies that making use of the pas t 
requires that we firs t interpret accurately. Like Havelock, Field 
and Jaeger , Grene sugges ts that our use of a thinker is limited by 
what he/she had intended to say. Grene suggests that we cannot  
extract principles of  politics, or  specific policies, from a larger 
philosophic framework and make sense of what we find. Finally, 
Grene s u00ests that our notion of politics itsel f is s omewhat 
arb i trary and sub j ect to change -- that  it is possible that our 
thought may not be useful at some later time. 
How useful is this position? Grene's view, of course, limits 
the extent to which we can make use of the pas t, and even dis-
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parages about what it is pol itical analysis is trying to achieve. 
Yet, it is very useful as a remind�r of another sort of d ifficulty 
we have when approaching Pl a to. Grene isolates a l imitation which 
relat ively few writers have been conscious of -- that thoughts 
have an analy t ical context as well as a social context , and that 
we do inj ustice to Plato when we try to extract ideas from the 
whole of h is thought. While I believe that we may use Pl ato ' s  
ideas in some form , despite this dif ficul ty , I also bel ieve that 
i t  i s  important to recogni ze this problem • 
.Summar ,. In this sect ion, I have presented a brief d iscussion 
of some analysts who quest ion whether Pl ato presented his argu­
ments in a form which we can use. Specifically, I have examined 
a nalysts who suggest tha t  Pl ato is less than useful because he 
fai l ed to present a view of "pol itics, " and one analyst who suggests 
that Plato ' s argument was made in a context which is fundamentally 
different from our own. What I have tried to make clear, is that 
�oth these views 5�c gest that the usefulness of a thinker depends 
on t he way he is interpreted, and provide very specific ideas of 
what  k ind of knowledge we look for when we review Plato. I have 
also tried to suggest that, while I differ with some of the assump­
t ions of these arguments , I believe that it is essential that one 
d ecide why one differs with these assumptions before one attempts 
to apply Plato's thought to our own pol itical problems. 
This chapter has been a review of how analysts have approached 
t he problem of comparing Plato ' s ideas to our own. I have attempted 
to discover what i t  means to argue that such a comparison cannot 
be made, as well as what it means to suggest a basis for making 
such a comparison. The next chapter will d iscuss some of the con­
clusions anal ysts who make tha t  comparison have reached about Plato . 
CHAPTER FOUR : How Should We View Plato? 
This chapter is different from the last. Chapter Three dealt 
with a question of method -- "how does one compare Plato ' s ideas 
to our own ( if such a thing is possible) ?'' -- and a question of 
compromise '' what costs is one willing £0 undergo to make that 
comparison? . '' This chapter deals with a question of ideology -­
"w!lat is a t  s take in viewing Plato a particular way?. "  The inter-
pretation and evaluation of Plato has not just been a matter of a 
choice of analytical tools ; it has been a real indication of how 
analysts have s t ood on pressing political issues . I will be examiniagsi 
three such issues of interpretation in depth : first, the view of 
Plato as a "totalitarian" (or a "democrat" ) ,  second, the view of 
Plato as a "natural law theorist, " and finally ,  the more recent 
-·· 
view of Plato as a "limits-to-growth theorist . "  
As a preface to what will be discussed here, a comment ought to 
be made about the relation between ideology and analysis . In a 
perfectly "calm" time, when no great political question presses 
for immediate consideration , it is relatively easy to write a de­
tached and r iqorous analysis of some political thinker of the pas t .  
Yet , when immediate answers are needed , and the stakes of making a 
accurate j udgement are much higher, it is difficult to be so dis­
passionate. In general, the writers to be discussed in this chapter, 
and particularly those examined in the first section, are aware of 
the iLlportance and immediacy of what they are deciding. To make 
sense of their arguments, and assess the significance of what they 
have written, one must understand the views of politics they feel 
need defend ing. In this chapter, I will examine how writers have 
used Plato to make an ideological argument , and what it has meant 
to view Plato  in a par ticular way .  
( 44 )  
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I have chosen three views wh ich I bel ieve to be both interesting 
and important, and which I believe illustrate three quite d i fferent 
ways in wh ich Plato has been thought of. While there is some over­
lap, these three ways can generally be d istinguished as follows : 
those who refer to Plato as a "total itarian" or a "democrat" have 
tended to use Plato as a "symbol " for these modern abstractions ; 
t hose who view P lato as a "natural lav1 theorist" have tended to 
think of him as the hr�ad of a "trad ition" of thought; those who 
t hink of Plato as a "l imits-to-growth " theorist have tended to 
look to h hi has a source of "conventional wisdom . "  Each of these 
de serves separate cons ideration: 
Section One: li? lato,.as a "Totalitarian" (or a "Democrat" )  
The question of whether Plato should be called a "total itarian" 
or a "democrat" is , perhaps, the best example of the three to be 
discussed of the way in which a dis pute of interpretation can have 
a Great deal of ideolog ical significance. Examination of this d is­
pute is useful not only because it has drawn the attention of a 
0reat many anal ysts , but also because it illustrates the\ problems 
t hat arise when analyses are c l 0€ely tied to strong ideological pos i­
tions. As I will explain, the two most important of these d ifficul­
ties are that the analytical d is pute tends to polarize into two 
camps with no mi ddle ground, and that the analyses become useful 
only to t hose who share the ideolog ical pos ition of the analyst .  
My discussion i n  this section will be d ivided into four parts: In 
the firs t, I will provide an overview of the terms of the d is pute ; 
i n  the second, I will discuss why Plato has been called a ''total ita­
rian''; in the t hird, I will exam ine why Plato has been called a 
i / t 
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"democrat" ; finally, I will provide a general conclusion about the 
ideological debate which has taken pl ace . 
a) What is this dispute about? It seems obvious to point out 
that one can argue tha t  it  is incorrect to call Plato a "totalitarian , "  
or t hat  a part icul ar basis for doing so is incorrec� without asserting 
that Plato ought  to be viewed as a "democrat . "  Yet this debate does 
not seera to allow for such a possibility .  As the t itle of a book 
by ��omas Landon Thorson suggests, it is simply a question of '' Plato: 
'T'otalitarian or Democra t? "  with no middle ground • .  
It  is par ticularly ironic then, that in a debate where the sides 
are so clear cut ,  the is sue itself should be somewhat unclear . 
·, ·-.' h l le bo t h  side s would agree that "totalitarianism" re:ers generally  
\ to some sort of repres sive regime which employs brute force to exer-
c i se the intere� � 8  of the s tate with little  concern for the individual , 
nei ther ma� e the ef fort to define the term more specifically . This 
ma y wel l  be because, during the late 1930' s and 1940 ' s  the definition 
o� rr total itarianism" seemed obvious, and not worth discussing. Yet, 
I believe t hat  a good deal of the difference of opinion between the 
two sides  over what causes totalitarianism stems from a difference 
of perception about what constitutes totalitarianism . To understand 
this difference, it is helpful to examine each position in depth . 
b )  Wh� a totalitarian ? Writers who have thought of Pl ato as a 
total i tar ian have argued in one, or both, of two ways: they have 
either � rgued that Plato held general understandings about the way 
politics ou i:J ht to work which have led historically, or tends to lead, 
analytical ly , to a totalitarian way of thinking, or that Plato pro­
posed certa i n  government chan:Jes which resemble those we may associate 
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with totalitarianism. These will be referred to respectively as 
n totalitarian by principle" and t t totalitarian by policy" and will 
be discussed, in turn. 
Totali tarian by principle. Writers like Renford Bambrough, Thomas 
"' 
Landon ?horson and R. F. Al fred Hoernle argue that it is inaccurate 
to call Plato a " totalitarian" merely on the pol icies which he advo­
cated. This is because they believe that these policies have an 
analytical context. Plato believed in the existence of true princi­
ples which ought to govern politics, and it is this belief which led 
hi m to the  conclusion tha t freedom lies in condemning all other 
opinions a s  fal se. Thu s , when we understand whi: Plato suggested 
th i s  pol icy , we can realize that he had as much appreciation for the 
need for f reedom as we do. On the other hand, these writers argue 
tha t Pla to's metaphysical position itsel f is inexorably linked to 
totalitariani sm. They suggest that the belief in the existence of 
true principles inevitabl y leads one to argue for the repression 
of ot her opinions through total itarian methods. Accordingly, they 
conclude that  Pla to ought to be called a "totalitarian . "  
This arg ument has three implications which I believe are important 
to note. The first is  that a belief in totalitarianism may stem 
f rom a misguided notion of what constitutes freedom -- i. e. that 
a writer who believes in the importance of "freedom" may rightly be 
called a totalitarian because he/she misunderstands what freedom 
con sist s of. This, in turn, suggests that some notions of "freedom" 
are, obj ec tively, freer than others. 
�2he s e cond impl ication ,.; i r� , ,tha t · on� n eed ··not · cortsi.der . ,t,Jha t princi­
ples a writer holds to be true to determine whether he/she should 
riqh tly be called a "to talitarian. " Hitler ' s  goal s may be less 
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laudatory than Plato' s ,  but it is the bel ief in absolute principles 
itself , and not the natur0 of those pr inciples, which leads one to 
advocate and j ustify repression by the state. 
F inally, this view also implies its contrapos itive -- that any . 
belief which is not total itarian must not rest on an argument for 
the existence of absolute principles. Thus, if Locke is not a 
totalitarian, then either h is conception of "natural law" does 
noLconst'i tu�t�e a belief in absolute principles, or he greatly mis­
understood the i�plications of his argument. 
�otalitarian by Po licy. Bertrand Russell  argues that we can 
see that Plato was a totalitarian just by looking at the policies  
he sugges ted. Among other things, Russell points to P lato's support 
for a " governmental, prerqga.tive of lying, " and the enforcement of 
i nequal i ty of privilege and pos ition. Russel l  makes no attempt 
to discover what the "analytical context" of these policies may have 
�een , and thus , tacitly rejects the initial argument of the writers 
j ust discussed. I f  taken to an extreme, 3 5  Russel l's view implies 
that the principles a writer believes to be important, or the fact 
that  a writer believes in principles at all, is irrelevant to an 
evalua t ion of the �riter' s · approach to politics. 
Like the "totalitarian by principle" argument, this view suggests  
that "freedom" and urepress ion T ' have ob j ective meaning s, and that 
pol icies which stem from a misguided notion of freedom are rightly 
cn lled "total itarian. " Unlike the last argument, however, this 
� r:: 
· · · · · :: t is difficult to say how much ought to be imputed based on 
R u s sell ' s omission. I am examining an extreme form of this view 
not only because i t  s hows what this approach leads to, but also be­
ca use it reflects the way people view ''tota litarianism" quite fre­
quently. Declarations on human rights generally proscribe policy 
not principles. I apolog ize for any inj ustice done to Russel l  in 
th i s  effort . 
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view makes it impossible to determine that a writer: was inconsis­
tent. Locke may be called a "democrat" or a "totalitarian" wi thout 
reference to anyth ing his principles may suggest. Finally, this 
view does not admit of the possib ility of devising policies which 
appe:1 r to be "repressive" out of a grea .. .:er scheme to achieve liberty. 
Th � �s ,  Rousseau's rhetoic about freedom, and Machiavelli's arguments 
for the need to "economize on violence" should not affect the way 
we evaluate the policies these writers proposed. 
Total itarian by both principle and poli cy. Karl Popper and 
R. H. s .  Crossman argue that Plato's theoretica l  approach to poli­
t i cs represents � total itarian way of thinking, and that this is 
evidenced by the fact that the policies he proposed are, obj ectively, 
totalitarian. These writers suggest that we can identify totali­
� a r ianism either by examin ing principles or policies, and that each 
or the two is , by itself , indicative of totali tarianism. 
The view th is impl ies of theoret ical analysis is similar to the 
view Gouldner and Barker's approach implies about historical analysis. 
P opper and Cro ssman s uggest that ideas determine and help explain 
a c t ion, but do not j ustify action. According to this view, we can 
know wha t policies are, objectively, totalitarian, and also know 
what principles , ob jectivel y, lead one to .:1.;dvocs:te these poli c ies. 
While the nature of the principles may help to determine how brutal 
the  re::, .:".·ession H.dvocated is,  it is the belief in principles which 
are true, and wh ich should order pol it i cs which leads · t:o repression. 36 
F inally, the ease with which one can make the determination that a 
wr i ter was a totali tarian suggests that few writers have historically 
been inconsis t en t  or ambivalent on this point. 
- -
3 6Popper specif ies that it is especially "historicism" and "tri­
balism which lead to totalitarian polic ies. See B ibliographic E ssay , 
for the d is t inct ion between his view and Crossman ' s. 
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A l l three of these approaches agree on one major point -- that 
Plato must be examined as a prime exampl e  of what to avoid . For 
th ·. )t;e who ca l l  him a "tota litarian by principle ·; "  what must be 
avoided is "vision" -- a be lief that'  politics · can and shou ld be 
based upon absolute , true principles of order. For Russel l, who 
calls Plato a "totalitarian by pol icy, "  we must avoid repressive 
measures, and it matters litt l e  on what basis these measures are 
avoid ed. For Popper and Crossman, we must avoid either, a nd both 
of these , because one imp l ies the other • .  Ironica l ly, al l these wri­
<) ters suggest that a politi ca l  system which wil l  tol erate differences ·<1 
of opin ion, but be into l erant to some sorts of views. 3 7  
A ll of these analysts use P lato as a symbol of the evil o f  totali­
tarianism. For each of them, it has become almost as important to 
defea 7- Plato analytical l y  as it is to defeat the forces of repression 
in our modern political lives . This is why the "tota l i tarian" or 
"democrat" debate is more significant than j ust an effort to make a 
definitive judg ement about a writer who died almost 2 500 years ago. 
Th is is also why these arguments seem l ess than usefu l  to those of 
us who are not part of this debate . Just as our interpretation of 
western movies would be significantl y  different if we believed that 
bla ck hat s  symbolized the "good guys, " our understanding and applica­
t ion of the P l a to  as a ' 'totalitarian" argument depends on our agree­
me n t  on what the sy�bol of Plato means. I wil l  now d iscuss some 
a nalysts who interpret the symbol of P lato quite differently� 
c )  � -Jhy a democrat? Given the nature of this dispute discussed 
earlier, to  ar�rue tha t P l ato ought ,not . to be cal l ed " a . ' "totalitarian" 
has become equivalent to arguing that he ought to be cal led a "demo-
3 7?or an in teresting view on this point, see John G. Gunnel l, 
Political Theory :  Tradition� ,and Interpretation ( Cambridge ; Mass , : 
1:Jinthrop Publishers, Inc. , 1979), p .  160 . 
-5 1-
crat . "  To mai ntain  wha t I bel ieve to be an  important  analyt i ca l  
d i s t i nction , however , I wi l l  refer to  the responses  t o  arguments  
whi ch l ink P l a to to  " tota l i tariani sm" a s , " not tota l i tarian by pri n­
ciple , r ,  and " not tota l i tarian  by pol i cy . " 
Not tota l i tari an by pri ncipl e . ·The analysts  who make thi s  argu­
ment agree wi th  those who argue tha t P la to i s  a '' tota l i tarian by 
pr i nci pl e ' ' t hat  i t  i s  i ncorrect  to tak e  P lato ' s pol ici e s  out of 
3 8  their ana l y t i ca l  context . These two school s o f  thought a l so agree 
that  P l a to bel ieved tha t pol i t ics  ought  to be ordered accordi ng to 
t rue pri nc i p l e s . Where the analys ts  to .  be di scussed here d i sagree 
wi th the o thers  is on the question of wha t view of pol i t ics  i s  im­
pl ied by P l� to ' s pri nci p l e s . Th i s  argumen t has taken ' · two forms . 
The f i rs t  i s  the sugges t i on of Robert Wi l l iam Ha l l ,  and other s , 
t h a t P l a to ' s concept of freedom i s  correct -- that freedom does  
con s i s t  i n  the s trivi ng of individua l s  to achieve a s  much of  per­
�ect ion as they are capabl e  of . Ha l l  argues tha t the view of free­
dom a s a l imi- t?_t ion of i ncursion i nto  t he act ivi ties  of i ndividua l s  
i s  actua l l y  more res tricted than P la to ' s concept .  
The s econd i s  th� vi ew of Leo S trau s s ,  John Ha l l owe l l , H . B .  Acton , 
and  others , tha t wha t actua l ly l eads to  tota l i tari an i sm i s  not t he 
be l ief  i n  pr incipl e s , but the  fa i lure to  recognize that  certai n  
pri n ci p l e s  -- such as  c l a ims  o f  individ ua l rights  -- ought  to 
t ranscend pol i t i ca l  exped i ency . These wri ters argue that when a 
s ta te fa i l s  to recognize a nd honor h ig her moral c la ims , i t  ha s no  
r i ch t fu l  b.a s i s  of  authori ty , and mus t emp l oy brute force to  exerci se  
i t s wi l l .  
':> O  
.r,) S ee e s pecial l y , the argumen t of E r i c  U nger , "Contemporary Anti-
P l a toni sm , "  i n  H enford Bambrough ,  ed . ,  P l a to , '  Po�Ter fillQ. P ol i tics : ( Cambridge , E ng l and : w . Heffer & Son s , Lmt . , 196 , pp . 91-107 . cf . 
J .  '.''. . F ind l ay , P lato, � Wr i tten � U nwri tten Doctrd; ne s  ( New York : 
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Both these arguments , l ike the argument they oppose ., ; suggest 
that we can have an obj ective unders tanding of what  constitutes  
freedom and of what types of thought l ead to totalitarianism. Unlike 
the opposing argument , however , theie· pbsitions involve a concern 
for what s or ts of princip l es a writer ho lds. The contrapositive 
impl i ed � -by  the§e views suggests that any thinker who is considered 
a "totalitarian " mus t not have a be lief in the "right" moral principles . 
T his means tha t, i f  we want to cal l �arx , Lenin or Gentile a totali­
tar ian thinker, or place that l abel, as at l east one writer has done , 39 
on the Catholic Church, we must demonstrate these these  individual s/  
0 roup held that no moral principl es shoul d infl uence the governance 
of  the political  order, or that the moral principl es they recognized 
'.rJere "wrong " ones . 
N ot to talitarian by policy. This argument , like the last� has 
\enerally take one of two forms. The fir s t  is to question the 
basic assumption that Plato's ideas can accurately be j udged by 
examining his policies al one. These include analysts who suggest 
t hat P l a t o ' ·s 5. aea s .have an ana: lytical con text, or a historical context  
wh ich , when understood, suggest tha t Rus sell ' s description is  inaccu­
rate. Evidence for this sort of view of Plato ' s  circumstances, can 
�tr , , i,A· r- � r I' 
�e seen in the arguments of Jaeger and Havelock discus sed earlier . 
�he second f orm of th is  argument has been to - sugg e s t  that Rus s ell 
;') 
and P opper misread Plato. This arguman/_ ' may or may not be tied to 
(__,,,,Y
• 
an i�plicit  ass umption that P l ato can accurately be j ud ged by his 
policies a l one. P erhaps the most extensive of thes e  arguments  is 
made by nona l d  Levinson , who sets out specifically to "defend" Plato 
ana in s t  virtually all of t�e cha r0es raised agains t him. 
Humanities Press, 19 74) , especially pp. ix-x, xiii . 
3 9  Renford Bambrough. See Bibliographic Essay. 
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The implications of the first argument have already been dis­
cus sed and need not be elaborated on further. The most important 
implication of the second argument is that it has virtually no .. . 
imp lications at all, except to suggest that some interpretations 
of P l a to are not as accurate as others. Levinson, especiall y, is 
�ore concerned with discuss ing why other views of Plato are faulty , 
t han he is with making a statement about how one should go about 
interpreting P l ato. 
What these two responses to the "Pl a to as a totalitarian" posi­
tion suggest is tha t the "totalitarian" or "democrat" dispute is, 
40 in l a rge measure, a battle over interpretation. The two sides 
seem to disagree over what a belief in absolute principles implies, 
and how Plato is to be understood. Yet, behind this battle is a 
question of what leads one to interpret Plato in a certain way . 
d) ,.,,.rhat is bel:ri nd this debate:' From the ongoing analysis, two 
c eneral statements can be made about the d isagreement between the 
1 1 J:. o t al i t a.rian" and "democrat " positions : first , that the dispute 
V rest s on an unsta ted disagreement over wha t  "total itarianism" entails, 
and second, that the most important as pect about the debate is not 
t he insig h t  i t  gives into Pl ato , but rather the way it illuminates 
two import ant ideological positions. These will be discussed, in turn. 
As I ment ioned earl ier, all the writers on this subj ect would 
agree on some general definition about totalitarianism, · but none 
provide a s pecific definition about what they are referring to. 
What  I have tried to suggest is that the two sides are not really 
examining the same thing when they talk about "totalitarie.nism." 
Popper , Crossman, Thorson and to some extent Russell think of 
40rt should be mentioned that I have deliberately avoided going 
in to depth ob what is , to some extent, an important subgroup among 
----------------
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" totalitarianism" primarily as a system which does not a llow for 
d issent, and associate the idea of liberal-democracy with the recog­
nition that differing opinions must be tolerated . This leads all  
t hese writers, with the exception of  Rus sell, to ask the question , 
"what view of politics wou ld lead one to be intolerant of dissent? . "  
�he answer they reach is that one wou ld be intolerant if one believed 
that one cou ld know what the correct answers are -- i . e .  if one felt 
that there were knowable true principles which order the universe. 
�hey conc lude that, s i nce Plato believed in such principles, he must 
be a " totalitarian. " 
Nriters like Hallowe l l  and Acton, on the other hand, think iof 
" t otalitarianism" primarily as a sys tem where rule is established 
by bru te force as opposed to liberal -democracy , where rule is 
established by legitimate authority. As a result, they ask the 
question, "what view of politics wou ld lead one to advocate a rule 
�1y force as opposed to authori ty7 . "  The answer they reach is that 
one would ad vocate such a ru le if one fails to recognize that there 
ex ists some principle ·that is ' above� the state which makes authority 
lec itimate. They conclude that, since Plato recognized that principles 
were h igher than the state, Plato cannot be called a "totalitarian. "  
?his debate would seem like little more than a discussion over 
se�antics, if it were not important for revealing these two basical ly 
contras t ing views of freedom . Those who believe that Plato is a 
totalitarian arg ue that a " vision" of transcendant principles is 
repuqnant to freedom, and counterproductive to our action in a "free" 
society . Those who argue against this position argue that such a 
" vis ion " is essent ial to the realization of freedom , and necessary 
t he " Plato as a democrat" position -- those who link Plato to a tradi­
t ion of " natural law. " I will  be discussing these writers in depth 
� �  t he next section of this chapter . For the most part, this genera-
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if  we are to know how to act. The former position suggests that 
the best way to approach p61 itics is to search for heuristic de­
vices or scientific laws which help exp lain action , and avoid an 
appeal to value- laden principles. The latter suggests that we 
mu s t  avoid using the tools of the natural sciences to explain the 
social  sciences, and look towards the principles which help us to 
make sense of our act ion. 
Conclusion. It is now possib le to understand the difficulties 
of us ing P lato as a symbol for an ideological position. When ideo­
l o0 ies are par t icularly strong, as in this case, the debate over 
i n terpretation tends to polarize into two camps , and the middle 
ground d isappears. Yet, ironically, the use of a symbol, as opposed 
to a li teral definition of the argument being made, obscures the 
terms of the d�bate. This shifts the focus of the debate to as 
d isagreement over the correct interpretation of the symbol being 
used , and makes it more d iff icult to see the real confrontation 
taki ng  place. This is especially true because tha type of ideolo­
g ical debate that would lead one to use Plato as a symbol, would 
also lead one to be less sensitive to the l imits and d iff iculties 
of applying such an argument. One would not expect Popper to con­
cl ude his arg ument with an explanation of the d iff iculties of looking 
a t  Plato as an abstraction -- it would destroy the power of the argument 
As a result, 1 1n less one agrees with the ideology of the analyst 
one is un like to make use of the argument being made. It is dif­
f icult to see where Popper's views might challenge one ' s  own. Yet 
this  use of Pla to, for a l l its diff iculties, is important to examine. 
T h is is because it helps to demonstrate how analysis of Plato can 
used to express an immediate and important ideological position , 
l i zation fits their analysis , as well. 
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a nd because i t  hel ps to provide an i n s i g h t  into wha t  thes� ideolo­
g i cal  pos i ti ons  are . T h i s  l at ter poi n t  can be bet ter unders tood 
by exami n i ng a rel ated facet of the ana lys i s  of P lato  -- the view 
of P la to a s  a " na tura l l aw theoris t . "  
Section �wo : P l a to as  a �a tura l Law Theor i s t" 
I f  one takes the pos i t ion tha t the ideas of the pas t  have formed 
some sort of coherent s tructure , i t  seems only na tura l to try . to 
exami ne the ways i n  which various idea s  have been rel ated . I t  i s  
because the ca tegorizing o f  t hinkers a nd their ideas i s  done so  
frequent l y  i n  pol i t ica l ana l ys i s , 41  tha t it  i s  important  to be aware 
of what i t  means  to rel a te one thinker ' s  ideas to a nother ' s .  Thi s 
s ec ti on wi l l  be primari l y  concerned wi th the argument s  of four ana� 
lysts : Rober t Wi l l iam Ha l l ,  Joseph Mag u ire ,  Leo S traus s ( and h i s  
s chool ) a n d  Joh n Wi ld . Each o f  these wri ters sugges t that P l ato 
ought  to be t hought  of as  part  of a " trad i tion of natura l law. 0 4 2  
T wi l l  be  sugges t i ng tha t l ook ing upon P l a to thi s  way has rea l imp l i ­
ca tion s , not on l y  o n  the way we unders tand P la to , but a l so o n  the way 
we view na tural law ,  and that i t  may not be very usef ul to l ook upon 
na tura l law t h i s  way . My d i scussion wi l l  be divided i nto three parts : 
the f irs t wi l l  examine wha t  i t  means  to  l ink P l a to t o  a '' trad i t ion" ; 
the second wi l l  d i scus s wha t  i t  means  to suggest tha t P lato  i s  part 
o:- the " na tura l l aw trad i t ion" ; the f i n a l  part wi l l  provide a con­
c l u s i on about the usefulnes s of l ook i ng at P lato  this  way . 
a )  Wha t does i t  mean t o  l ink P la to to a " trad i t ion? " The word 
" t rad i t 1 on "  has  common l y  been used i n  ei ther of two ways . 43  I n  
41E ven I may have been gui l ty o f  such a thing from t ime to time.  
/!_ ? - �Actua l l y ,  Ha l l  l i nk s P l ato to wha t he ca l l s  the '' tradi tion of 
i nd ividua l i s� , ' ' but h i s  argument is qui te s imi lar to the others . 
4 3 .. , : or a i'1 iore thorough presen tat ion  of  thi s d i s t i nction ,  see Gunnel l ,  
pp . 6 6-8 8 .  
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one usage, it denotes a "commonality of viewpoint" -- e . g .  a writer 
who argues that we need to protect the rights of individuals against 
the wi ll  of the maj ority , may be said to be representative of the 
" tradition " of l iberal though t .  This is the way Maguire and Hal l  
use the term . The other usage refers to an evolving , or perhaps , 
degenerating , process of political discussion through the ages --
a " great d ialogue" i::o which all  the thinkers of tbe past contributed . 
r�,his i s  the way Strauss and Wi ld  use the term. "Tradition" in the 
former sense refers to an ana lytical category , and does not neces­
sari l y sug gest tha t thinkers knew they were part of a "tradition" 
a t  the  -: i:.1e they wrote. "Tradi tion" in the latter sense t.L d iscussion 
wh i ch �a s been consciously perpetuated by thinkers up until the pre-
s ent  � 4  day. These will be briefly examined, in turn. 
Trad ition bv commonality. Hall def ines " individual ism" in such 
a way that it relates his interpretation of Plato to a general view 
of  the merit of t he ind ividual that one migh t associate with liberal­
democracy. �--1 aguire defines "natural law theory" as a bel ief that 
t here are principles which transcend the political process . To 
a r0,ue tha t Plato  shares these views with others , is to suggest that 
t�e s imi lar± ty � between P l �to • s  argument and that of other thinkers 
i n  t he ntradit ion" is more important than the difference . I n  
. :aguire ' s  argumen t, for example, this suggests that it is more · ac­
cura te a nd useful to think of Plato and Bentham as related , because 
they both rely on the existence of principles, than it is to suggest 
t ha t  Plato's principles differ so significantly from Bentham's that 
t he two are not easily compared. 45  
4- t:, See Ib id. It  seems possible to use "tradition" in both senses 
e. 9. l:osay that Lock advanced the "tradition" of .:. l i-beral thinking 
to a hig her stage by using ideas of "na tural rights" to respond to 
F illmer's concept of t he divine right of k ings . N one of the writers 
discussed here, however , seem to use the term th is way. 
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It is useful to see what views are rej ected when one tries to 
find where Plato "fits " in relation to other theorists. One such 
view is that a thi nker must be understood on his/her own terms, and 
no t in relation to a "type of thinking. " One might suggest that 
such a broad category misses the important differences between 
thinkers. A lternatively, one might argue, as Quentin Skinner has, 
tha t there are important political implications that stem from re­
lat ively m i nor differences in viewpoints, and that it makes little 
sen se to think of politics in terms of broad similarities . 46 Finally, 
one might s ug qest that at tempting to categorize Plato limits his 
app l icability to a wide range of viewpoints by implying that one 
cannot look to Plato to find the source of arguments which have 
4 7  bee n  u sed to oppos e a particular tradition -- such as natural law . 
Tradition of the nqrea.t dialoaue. " Strauss suggests that the 
�i s tory o� politi cal theory can riqhtly be understood as a continual 
d eparture from Plato' s view tna t p6 liti cs  is based on correct princi­
ples which exist in nature. Wild argues that the history of politi­
ca l th eory can be characteri zed by the combination of other principles 
with Pla to's; he suggests that Plato's view of "natural law" regained 
in fluence in  the writing of Paine, and has been a part of American 
political thought every since. Both these views suggest that all 
of pol i tical thought can be understood in its relation to Plato, and 
to  P l ato ' s �fi:ew of "natural law. " This suggests that all theorists 
ei ther accepted or rejected "natural law, " and that no thinker can 
t c:: .: �·Maauire considers "utilitarianism"  to be a principle which fits 
h i s def inition. See Bibliographic Essay. 
11 ,:::;  
· '-- ' Dee "mean i ng and Understanding in the .History of Ideas, " His tor� 
and �heory ( VI I I , 1 ) ,  1 969,  especially p. 5 2 . 
4 7Here aga in , it is possible to sugg est that Plato is at the root 
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be evaluated without assessing his/her contribution to the debate on 
"natural law . "  Thus, unlike the other view of "trad ition," th is usage 
is geared toward characterizing the disagreement between thinkers . 
Lite the other view, however , this usage has met with a good 
48 
deal of criticism , par�icu larly from John G. Gunnel l .  Gunnell ques-
tion s the existence of a "great dialogue , "  and suggests that the 
part icular circumstances under which thinker� wrote , and their 
own dispos ition at the time they wrote, were far more important in­
f l uences on their thought than any grand view of their place in an 
onqoing d iscussion . Gunnell also argues that approaching the past 
t h i s  way distorts the importance of one particular aspect of 
theory. Final l y , he suggests that  placing Plato at the head of 
t h i s  " tradition" runs the risk of equating "pol itical theorists " 
with " phil osophers , " and so misunderstanding what they were attempting 
to achieve . 
I n  s hort , both views of tradition suggest that theory over time 
can be compared , and t ha t  writers are best interpreted and evaluated 
in  their relation to other writers . Moreover, both have implications  
no t  only for how we view Plato , but al so for how we view the thinkers 
w�o �al lowed him , and the  iss ues which these  thinkers discussed . 
To su� £est tht:i t t here is a "tradition" of thought is to suggest more 
than  a similari ty between views ; it is to imply that a certain im­
porta nt con�ept of our political theory has been understood to refer 
t o  the same thing since Plato' s time . I wil l now discuss what it 
mea n s  to look at "natural law" in thi s way . 
of  quite a few tradi t ions, and even two or more conflicting traditions. 
�h i s , however, would bl urr the d istinction between comp�ting tradi­
t ions and make the concept less useful.  None of the analysts discussed 
here argue in this way . 
4 8Gunnell, esp. pp. 84-86, 1 3 7-1 3 8. 
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b) What does it mean to suqoest that Plato is part of a ''natural 
law trad ition? '·' Plato used the term nomos·-: tes physeos only once; 
callicles dis tingui shed the "law of nature" that  "might makes right" 
fro� the artificial laws that the weak try to impose on the strong.49  
1
;-._
1 h e n  Plato spoke o f  an "individual, " h e  used the word idiotes . -- a 
term which carried the connotation of privatism and even of a foolish 
desi re to separate from society.so  Clearly, an attempt to asso-
cr-te Plato with the trad ition of "natural law" and n individua:lJsm·'l· re­
quires tha t  one read so,h ing into Plato; more importantly, it 
requ ires that one read something into these two concepts. 
All four of the analyst s d iscussed define the terms they examine 
as  involving some sor t of belief in the existence of higher principles 
wh i ch tran scend the empi rical world. Beyond that, they divide into 
two d i fferen t definitions. The def init ion Strauss and Wild provide 
of  "n2 turaJ. l aw , "  and the def in ition Hall provides of "individualism, " 
i nvolve an  unders tanding that, whi le external principles do not inevi-' 
� -� :) l y  de t e r.-m i ne our act i.on , these principles are "good, " s:o.ch �: that 
\·..re n ot H]ht" to arrange our pract ices and conventions to conform with 
t hese  prin ciples as much as possible. Maguire's definition (see p. 5 7 )  
i. t  :"Juch broader ; he sug ges ts that "na tural law" describes any 
t heory which ' 'posits a universally acceptable criterion, and a 
s o ·.1rce of mora l validity of positive law and posit ive morality 
. d d t r: th 1 i 1 t d . d 1 t f • t: . , S i  J n  epen en o x  e e� s a or an 1n epen cen o .  socie y . 
L1 9 . • C]orq J_ a s  4 8  3E , see Joseph P. Maguire , "Plato' s  theory of Natural 
Law , ' ' in A l f red R. 3el l inger , ed. , Yale Class ical Stud ies (New Haven: 
Yale Un i vers i ty Pres s , 1947 ) ,  v. 10-, p .  15 1n. 
5 0see '.Herner Jaeger , Paideia , 2nd E d ition ( New York: Oxford Un iver­
s ity Press , 1 94 5) ,  v .  1, p. 444 , n. 4 5 . Id ioti s is the root for 
words l ike " idiom , "  "id ios yncratic, " and "idiotic. " 
r: 1 
· · · ·· Maq �Jire , p . 1. 5 1 .  'I'h is applies even to "subjecti ve'' criteria. 
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�o determine what each of these two view s  mean, I will discus s each 
with reference to three ques tions:  1) what is thi s  view saying? ; 
2 )  what theorists wou ld  be called "natural law theorists " by this 
def inition�: • 3 )  what are the implications of thinking of ''natural 
law" in thi s  way?. 
Strauss , �·.Jild and Hall and the "good " principles. To understand 
what this view is saying, it i s  hel pful to analyze it in light of 
what it is not saying. All three of thes e  .analysts think of the 
concepts they describe ( which, for the sake of convenience will both 
he referred to  as "natural law" ) as  being rather s pecific. Firs t , 
t hey 
t ha �: 
define na ture law as  something which can only be good 
nature i s  not some th ing which we are here to overcome. 
. -- i . e .  
Second, 
t�ey believe that natural l aw is  always consonant with the trure higher 
a spira tion s of each human being -- i . e. that "natural law" is not 
i :1  con f l ict  with the "real" interests of any individual. Third, 
·'.: '.·-: ey  s �_1 c17e s t  tha t cus toms and conventions in poorl y ordered socie-
t ies may not reflect th ,:? "natural law" i. e. that natural law 
i s  not irres i stJble , and that ordering a society according to natural 
law ( as much a s  such a t hing is possibl e )  requires some effort. 
r i na ll y ,  t hey s uggest tha t , while natural law can be used as a 
s tandard to j udge action, the claim that natural law makes on us 
derives onl y  fr.om the fact that it , i s " goodn in a normative sense 5 2  
i. e. tha t " reason u tcJl ls  us that we ought to follow the natural law, 
becau se 1 1 rea son 1 1  shows us that the natural law is the perfect way 
in which e>: i s.tc nce can be ordered. 
c; ? - · -- see John 1L"l ild , P lato ' s  Modern Enemies 1!.!J£ � Theory .Qf. Natural 
� ( Chi cago : The University of Ch icago Press, 19 5 3 ), pp. 81-8 5, 116-
11 7 ,  Leo S t raus s , Natural R iah t 1!D£ H istory (Chicago : University of 
Chicago P ress , 19 5 3 ) , pp. 12 6-12 7, 1 39 ,  and Robert William Hall, Plato 1!.!J£ � Indiv i dua l (The Hague , Netherlands : Martinus Ni jhoff, 1963 } , 
pp. 1 7-18, 2 1 6 for statements of this argument. 





The last a�pect of the definition is particular l y  important 
becau se it d.i f fers from the way the term "natura l  law" is often 
� 3  used. -- According to this definition , "natural law" is prescriptive 
only in the  sense thr. t it " defines what is good for us. " It is our 
" reasonu and not the law itsel f  V·lhich direct us to act. Horeover , 
the 0law 1 1  is  not proscr iptive in the sense that it tel ls individuals 
o� qovernmen t s  t hat n t hou shal t not" do something. This l�w.. does 
not  s tem from a view that individuals  are estranged from society , 
or that � i nd i vidua l s  are in need of protection.5 4  It does not in­
vol ve wha t S a bi ne has cal led a ' 'claim to an inherent right to have 
one ' s personality respected. 0 5 5  
Under thi s  definit ion o f  "natural law, " the l ist o f  "natural 12.w 
t h eori s t s ' ' i s  extremely  l imited. A s  men t ion�d earlier , Strauss, in 
pa rticul ar , sees  a ll theorists after P lato as  representing "devia­
t ion s 1 r  fror:1 this tradition. Vlild sees ther:principle of "natural 
l i k e  
rena i nin; importance in  the writing of  Paine, and in documents 
the : Jnited Nations Declaration on Human R ights. 5 6 St. Thomas 
Aq�i na s . wou l d  be excluded from this definition , because of his 
bel ief  in a law that was both prescriptive and proscriptive. Hobbes 
and Lock e W0\1 l d  be excluded on this basis, and also on the basis 
t h a t  bot h  s ee na tural l aw to be , to some extent , in �opposition to 
�a n ' s  self- interes t and acquisitivenes s. 
� 2 ,.. .c �, ee , � or example , Goerge H. Sabine, A History of Politica l Theory, 
".1. s t  : ·: d :. tion ( N ew YQrk : Henry Ho lt :: . .  Co , 193 7 ) ,  pp. TT2-158. 
r:: /1, 
-- · Hall , p. 2 1 6. 
r.. c.: 
· · ' sa bine, p. 143. S abine suggests that this sort of  bel ief grew 
ou t of the alienation and powerles snes s individual s felt after the 
n i s2tppeara n ce of the .2,01 is .; - �sees the roots of "natural law" in 
the  wri t i n g s  of  t �e S toics a nd S toic Revisionists , and in Cicero. 
"' h -· -· :c tend to think ;:J- t h �Ls  Declaration as representing  an appeal 
;;�  J.wvDl-d,� /n/4 "ev-.2A • 
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Hall is not quite so clear about what writers wou ld be put in 
t he same cat egory with Plato. H is definition of " individualism" 
invol ves a n  understanding that there is fellowship and community 
be tween ind ividual s, and that these individuals are not estranged 
from each other. Thus wou ld seem to exclude Hobbes and Locke. As 
he is not so r:mch concerned with the nature of " law" per ..§!: ,  however, 
i t  i s  possible tha t Hall's definition wou ld include Aquinas, a long 
wi th  Ari s totle, �ore, Rousseau , Paine , Jefferson and Hannah Arendt . 
ti i s  def inition would definitely exclude St. Augustine, Machiavel li, 
Ca l vin, Hamilton and Nietzsche. It is  d i ff icult to tell where he 
m i �h t  pu t a wri ter like John c .  Ca lhoun. 
The implications of look ing at "natural l aw" in this way are 
q 1 1 i te impor t.ant. deyond the analytical difficulties of "who ought 
� o  be called what , ' ' t hi s  view affects the way we interpret impor­
�: a r1 t phi losophical and political terms. "Morality , "  for example , 
s terns from "knowledge" - - i. e. if we real ly "know" what is right, 
,.,.re wi 1 1  do  it. " : �mmoral i ty , "  therefore , is  equa ted with "ignorance. " 
.. : hu s , t here i s  no way in which an individual can be said to be 
" re s ponsible n for action , if "respons ibility" is understood to 
�7 require tha ·;:: one " know wa�'l.s right , "  and yet conceivably act other-
'di se. "Just ice" cannot merely be based on a societal agreement, or 
2. recoc;:;n i tion of  procedures , it must be based on "knowledge " ;  this 
i ·-.1p li.-.� s that t he enforce;nent and maintenance of "justice"  ought to 
be wha t one mig ht call " paternal istic" -- that those who "know" ought 
::o �:,ake  sure that the  " ignorant" act j ustly , even if the "ignorant" 
t h i n� o therwi s e. As ment ioned earlier , th is view suggests that 
�o t he ri� � t s of  i nd i vid uals to  be respected as human beings , and 
be l ieve tha t ;:r ild i n terprets t his dif ferently from the way I do. 
·-:::1 i s  i l l us t ra t e s  how one's as socia t ion of "na tural law" wi th Plato 
shapes one ' s perception of contemporary ideas. 
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" l iberty" and  " freedom" i nvol ve the abi l i ty to  aspire towards wha t 
i s  " g ood , "  a nd not merel y  the abi l i ty to act in  the way one bel ieves 
one •4ould  l ike to.  As  s u ch, " na tura l rights"  do not exis t  to protect 
one ' s c la im t o  " i nd ividua l i ty , " ra ther they represent  the s tandard 
on wh i ch the  meri t s  of s uch cla ims are j udged . Whi l e  i t  i s  important  
not  to  impute  P l a to ' s views to  those who analyze him , one can comment 
tha t t hose  ·who def ine  " na tura l l aw" i n  t h i s  way , are maki ng a s ignifi­
can t  s tatemen t  about the  way a great deal  of  our wor l d  mus t  be  viewed . 
Maquire and the bel i ef i n  pri ncipl e s . Maguire ' s view of " na tural 
l aw' '  i s  re l a t ive ly  s impl e . Na tura l l aw i s  defined a s  a bel ief in  
t he  exis ten ce of higher pri nciples , a s  opposed to wha t  S traus s might  
ca l l  " convent iona l i sm" -- the  bel ief tha t wha tever " pr i nci ples " exi s t  
a re merel y  t h e  resu l t o f  t he cus toms , unders tandi ng s , and general 
u sa�e  of man , and do not  exi s t  outs ide  of the empiri ca l  world . 
�hi s  vi ew i s  a s  broad a s  the other view i s  narrow . Al l the theoris t s  
;nen U . o: ' ed wi t h  regard to t he other . .  v i  e\•J _.; , wi th the except ion of 
c:; '7 
.... • I 
�! i e tz s che , a re i nc luded under th i s  def i n i t ion . The onl y  thinkers 
who migh t be excl uded are those who s pecif ica l1y re j ec t  such pri nci­
p l e s  -- e . g . Popper , Cro s sma n , Thorson , etc . , as wel l  as s trict 
" emp i r ici s t s . "  
Where the imp l i cat ions of the f ir s t  vi ew suggested tha t much of 
our ph i l osoph i c  and pol i t i ca l  language would  have to be unders tood 
i n  a very s pec i f i c  way ,  the  impl ica tions of thi s def ini tion would  
s u9nes t tha t thi s l a nguage can i nvolve (:n t te a few d ifferent , and 
equa l l y  appropriate  mea n i ng s . "Mora l i t:y , "  for examp l e , can be 
unders tood to s tem from " k nowl edge , "  H fa i th , "  "good character , "  
5 7Machiave l l i  i s  on the border l i ne , dependi ng on how one interprets 
t he a ppea l bei ng made in doc t r i nes  l ike  " economi zing on  violence . " 
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"bad cons cien ce , " "enlightened self-interest, " "unenlightened self­
interest , " "historical or theoretical inevitabl l l ty, " and perhaps 
even " sheer luck. " The only real limitation that Maguire ' s  defini­
tion suggests is that, whatever "morality" is understood to mean, 
it has a basis -- obj ective or subjective -- outside of the empirical 
·world. 
c )  How u seful is  it to link Plato to a ' tradition of natural law?" 
What I have tried to suggest is that Plato's thought differs in an 
i � portant way from theorists who have often been thought to reflect 
a " t raditional view of natural law" -- St. Thomas . Aquinas, Thomas 
· ; o�bes, ,John Locke , and others. To 'define "natural law" in such a 
wa y so a s to include Pla to , therefore, involves limiting the defi­
n i t � o�  s uch t h a t t �ese  other thinkers are not included , or expandirig 
t�e definition , such that writers with different views all are con­
s ide�ed under the same label . To choose the first, puts a specific, 
and  to some extent, unusual, construction on the way much of our 
pol i t i cal world and political language must be understood. To choose 
t � e  second , makes our political lansuage so broad as to be almost 
mc2 n i rw l c s s . 
Here again , n ei ther of these dif ficulties, and particularly the 
f i rs t , are ve ry great if one wants to view politics thc . . way� implied 
by the definition s. Yet , if one believes that politics ought to 
be understood differently, and that our political terms should be 
ne i t her as na rrow as  the first , nor was broad as the second, linking 
r., J. 2. Lo to  t he " t rad ition of na tural law" is not very useful. As 
in the use of Pla to as a ' 'symbolr the nature of this approach also 
makes  it dif f i cult for writer ' s  to recognize the constructions they 
do put on po l i tical language, and this , in turn, makes the taxonomy 
or connection bei ng made even more diffi cult to use. 
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The two views of trad i t ion are usefu l ,  however , in  i l lus trat i ng 
ways  i n  whi ch var ious t hou g h t  ca n be compared , and , i n  t he case of 
the  " trad i t i on of the grea t deba te , " con tra sted . We may not want  
to  appl y  P l a to a s  a s ta ndard for viewing  a l l  wri ters , but  approach ing 
t he pas t  th i s  way does hel p t:o •i l lumina te wha.t it means  to d iffer wi th 
P l a to .  Perhaps  some trad i t ions  coul d  be l inked to P l ato  at l ess  of 
a cos t  to our unders tand i ng of pol i tics . I n  any event , to speak of 
P l a to  a s  part of a " trad i t ion , "  requires that we recognize how this  
approach affects  our unders tand ing of  his  ideas , ��d  a l so how i t  
a f fec ts  the way we view ourselves . I wi l l  now exami ne a d i fferent 
a pproach to s e l f-percep t ion -- the view of P lato a s  a '' l imi ts- to-
r: rowth"  theor i s t .  
Sec t i on Three : P l a to a s  a "Limit s- to-Growth" Theoris t 
?he wri ters  to be d i s cu s sed i n  th is  sect ion are not qui te so  
concerned wi t h  approach ing  P l a to a s  they are wi th  approaching P lato ' s 
i d c2. s . They do " l abe l "  P l a to -- as  a " l i mi ts-to-growth"  theori s t  
a nd even make  a j udgmen t about h im . The form o f  their j udgmen t , 
however , i s  to  sugges t tha t P l a to i s  " good " because  sor;ie of hi s ideas 
a re of use to us -- i . e .  t h a t  he , un l ike some other theori s t s , i s  
\:1or thw� i l e  a s  a sou::..'ce o f  " convent iona l wisdom"  on a particu lar i ssue.  
Thi s v iew is  wor th  exami n i ng for two reasons : f irs t , because i t  
i s s ign i f i can t l y  d i fferent  from the others I have exami ned , thi s 
a pproach  he l ps to i l l us tra t e  a d ifferen t way i n  whi ch examining P lato 
a f fec t s  t he way we def i ne a contemporary argument ; second , because 
it re l a te s  P l a to to an  i s sue  whi ch has  g a i ned importance · rel a f ivery 
recen t ly ,  i t  he l ps to i l l us trate how might  be used i n  the future. 
The wri ters  who have l i nked P la to to a " l imi t s�-:-_ to-growth "  perspective 
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include Mulford a .  Sibley, 58  William Ophul s and E. J .  Mishan. 59  I 
hope to s how that  t his  approach has the interes ting implication of 
broadening the pos sibl e ways in which P lato can be viewed, while 
nar�owing the  ways in which we view a contemporary is sue. To 
explain th �s point , I will examine first, the nature of their argu­
men t, se�ond , the implications of this argument on how we view Plato 
and ,�ur contemporary probl ems , and f inal ly, the u sefulness of thi s 
2 �proach for hel pins1 u s  to  understand ourselves. 
.� . 
�Jhat are thes e  analysts saying? Sibley, Ophul l r ��d \Mi shan a�e 
no pre tens e towards examining Plato with an "open"  mind . Quite the 
con trary, they look to the past specifically to see if they can find 
some addit ional insight into a problem which they consider to be 
extremel y important. The issue i s, "how are we to make sense  of 
t�e need for psychological and economic limits in our society?. " 
�hat Sibley finds in Plato, primarily, is a recognition that man 
has  a pl ace in h is eGviron�ent, and that the way to the good life 
i s  not t hrough ever- increasing desires and complexity ,  but through 
( '; e  " s p j_ r j_ t "  of  accep ting l imita tion s. Ophuls goe s further to argue 
( a nd  , :is han to impl y )  that Plato provides us  with a demonstration of 
'-.'.Th 2 :: ha ppe n s  wh en a ma s s  society i s  "on the edge." .Ophuls . a rgu e s  
t �2
L P la to shows us that when a society g ets so complex that laymen 
ca nnot hand le probl ems , the rule of the state  must be turned over 
to n t et;:hnical exper ts 0 -- in P 1ato's case , guardians. Ophul s concludes 
lJ ,.r su c1gesting t ha t  Popper shows u s  the agonizing choice between d .is­
order 1 ano  the  end of freedom , which is  implicit in Plato ' s  argument. 
,- �  
>:\abley actually combines quite a few different ways of approachino 
Pla to ( see p .  3 1 ) , and doe s link P lato to a "tradition" of thinking. _, 
H i s  ana l ys is is a par ticu larl y good example  of  thi s approach, however. 
=:: Q  
., J . � i s han only makes mention of Plato once , to s tate that he has 
ref ra ined from citing "u s e f ul"  exampl es from Plato and Popper. His 
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I n  both these arguments, Plato is examined for the particular 
insight he can give on one issue, and not for the way the sum of 
his thought can be characterized or categori2ed. Both views express 
the idea than an intelligible statement can be extracted but oft the 
ana l y t i cal and historical context of Plato ' s writing . As Ophuls 
pu t s  i t, these writers do not seek guidance in "Plato ' s  revelation" 
abo11 t the ex istence of � priori principles, but rather in Pla to ' s  
understanding of "hm·1 the process of getting daily bread can affect 
6 0  the polit ical process. " Moreover, they believe that, despite 
the  d i fferences between  Pl a to' s argument and the modern argument 
for l i�i t s, that  the two refer to fundamentally the some sort of issue. 
'._·.'ha t d oes  this arcn .1men t imply7 �-·1ost of the implications of this 
s ort  of  arg ument on our unders t anding of Plato were explored in 
Chapter Three ( s ee es pecially, pp. 30-3 2 ) . A couple  of additional 
comments can be added , ho\ tc:ver. This view allows for the possibility 
tha t we may extract many arguments from many different, and even 
con flicting thinkers. Ophul s, for example, uses both Plato and Popper. 
I t  sugce st s t ha t writers may be useful for insights into some matters, 
and  not  ve ry u seful for o thers. While it involves a "subj ective" 
j ud ,-.e ::ient abou t wha t views are to be "useful" -- norie of these 
ana ly sts f i nd much use in a thinker who demonstrates the most effi­
cien�  way of  ac�ieving pro9�ess and economic prosperity -- it allows 
for t � e  pos sib ili ty that  many different analysts can look to Plato 
I 
f or ins i ght into many different matters. As a result, as long as 
�la to's conventional wis dom serves him, many facets of his theory 
can be adap ted to dif f erent purposes. 
ar� n.u71ent,  and u s e  of t �ese writers , would seem to be similar to Ophuls. 
For a writ er  who i l l u s tra tes , implicitly, how one might apply Plato's 
·1 i ev1 of  l ir.i it s to  this perspect ive ,  see E. F. Schumacher, Small 1:..§. 
Bea 1Jt,i_;L_;l ( N ew York : Harper C.: Row, 1 9 7 3 ) . 
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Of more significance , however, are the imp lications of this 
approach on the way in wh ich we understand the "limits".9to-growth" 
pt:rspect i ,.re. Firs t ,  it sug gests that "limits-to-growth" has always 
been a '�easonabl �' posit ion. P lato wrote long before the effects of 
the last century of modernization provi ded the type � ·of empirica l 
evidence which writers like Mishan and Ophuls use to support their 
a rgument tha t l imits are needed. This suggests that, whi let t�e need 
for l imits may have become more urgent in recent years, mank ind has 
a l ways  been remis s in f ailing to recog nize this need. A conf licting 
pe r-ception of "limits " would suggest that, up until comparatively 
recently , we have been far  away from our limits , but, as we continue 
to grow exponentia lly , we are rapidly approaching that point. 61 
Secor:d , it sugges ts that the appeal of the " limits-to-growth" 
a.rsument i s ,  in some sense , independent of the principles on which 
s uch a n  argument is justified. Sibley, for example, points not to 
some metaphysical principles, or even assumptions about the nature 
of ; ')oJ .::ti c s , but rather to a "spirit" of limitation found in writers 
li �: e  P t a to, Ar istotle , Aquinas, More, Jonathan Swift, Rousseau and 
s a�uel Bu tler . As mentioned earlier, Ophuls makes it clear that he 
re j ects  the principles wh ich underlie Plato' s argument. Thus suggests 
t�a t our apprec i a t ion for Plato's argument for limits does not stem 
f ro� a n  appreciation of  the · t heoueti cal ideas. which � led him to argue 
i n  thi s way , but rather from the reasonableness and attractiveness 
of the appeal it self . 
Finally, the "spirit "  of limitation also exists independent of 
t h e  specif i c  policy wh i ch i s  suggested, or even the specific j ustif i-
!'": Q 
"' l:'f il U. am Cphuls , E cology � lb!: Poli tics ,2! Scarcity ( San Fran-
c i sco: 'i-..1. H . F' reer.ian r- Co. , 197 7) , p. to . 
� ...,  
v �Thi s sort of  argument is  suggest�d by Rufus E. Miles , in Aw�ken­
F rom t he American Dream ( New York : Universe Books , 19 76 ) . · 
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ca tion for the policy proposed. Pl a to argued tha t  his Cretan city 
s hould be limited to 5 , 040 citizens , in part, beca use i t  was neces­
sary for all the ci tizens to know each o ther.62 Sibley interprets 
J,.. h . ·- , 1 S a s  a demons tra t ion of Pla to' s unders tanding of the need for 
p ! &nning , and sug9ests : th�t  this spirit would be reflected in the 
modern worl d  if cit ies limited their population to 250, 000. 6 3  Thus , 
S ibley suggests tha t wha t  we learn from Plato is the sense of what 
t I 1 1  t .  h .  \I,, o • f 1 '": t_h 1 64 �1e su �:qes  . s , and  not rca y sugges 10.ns · .. � ,. 1en ·· are use u emse ves . 
i !m,l useful is this approach:' I have trie,d to make clear tha t 
� �is approach is far more useful than the other two in permit ting 
a broad ra noe o�  possible uses of Pla t o's ideas. I t  is well -geared 
�:m:2t rd s a t temp �· inc� t:o extrance any .idea from Plato which seems to 
�e , , s eful , and is not cen tered on making some definit ive j udgement 
2bou t Pla to himself. 
7 ha · ··e also  tried to s ugges t tha t  viewing Pla to as a source of 
n conven t iona l � ..,.r i s nom , " like viewing him as part of a "tradition, " 
�e s i �pl i ca t ions for the way we understand our modern times. Speci­
n. ca lly , t h i s  approach limits the type of appeal tha t  the "limits­
to-� rowt h '' pers pective can make. I t  suggests that the real justi­
f i ca t ion for l imits lies not in the sta tistics of recent growth and 
i t s  i�pact , nor in the princ iples tha t lead one to argue for limits , 
nor in a litera l underst� nding of the policies which have been pro­
po s ed to implemen t  it, bu t ra ther in the ,spirit '' which accompanies 
Tf  Pla t o's arg ument is truly  suggestive, i t  is so because of 
S :\.,r u l ford Q .  S ibley, "The Relevance of Cl assical Polit ical Theory 
for � c�romy , 'Technolooy and Ecol ogy , u Del ivered at  the ·t972  Annual 
• � . ,!.- • ;:,:.; ' ·F=' J,.. 1 /1, • . D 1 • ;- • . 1 (." • A • t . ( I ,., h . t · ee - _ i n  : o .,. L .1e  ,", 1":1er 1can 1:· o 1 _ 1 ca .. ;c1ence ssocJ_a ion �� .. as 1ng on: 
A7er i can  Pol i t i cal S c ience  Associa tion , 19 7 2 ) , pp. 1 7, 3 1. 
C. I! ,.. 'I bi  d • 1 p • 2 9 • 
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the a l luring nature of his perspective. Yet, if one does not find this 
perspect ive inately alluring already, one is unlikely to find this 
argument convincing. Thus, when limit s-to-growth is defined in 
s uch a way that i t  is a topic which concerns . · both Plato, and our­
selves , the appeal which might coniince one to support the argument 
is lim ited. The essence which defines "limits-to-growth" becomes 
much narrower as one tries to apply Elnto ' s  ideas to the issue. 
Summary. I have just examined three different ways in which Plato 
ha s been viewed. In the first section of the chapter , I discussed 
,.-l ':1a t  l t  mea n s  to look upon Plato as a "symbol " of a "totalitarian" 
or a "democra t. " I sugsested that this argument may be useful for 
rallyi ng s upport for an ideological issue a t  a critical time , but 
tends to be less than useful when the emergency passes. In the 
second sec tion , I examined the view of Plato as part of a "tradition 
o :  na t ural law. ' '  I ar9ued that this approach is useful for helping 
to  illu�inate wha t it has meant to disagree with Plato, but runs 
t he r i sk of  embu ing our political lang uage and our understanding of 
0 · 1 r \·mrld wit h Pla to's meanings. F lnally, I examined the view of 
Pla to as a sou.rce of "conventional wisdom" for the argument ofi "limits­
to �rowt h. 1 1  I a rgued that this approach allows for a broad use of 
Fla to , but tend s to narrow the usefulness and appeal of the limits­
-:- o- r--- rowt 1:. ar0u�1ent ,  by implying that the argument for limits in 
P l a to is  e ssentially the same as the modern posi tion . 
In short , it means somethin0 to evaluate Plato in a particular 
wa y. Our view of Plato shows something about our ideological posi­
t i on , and our under s tanding of political language i and we must be 
aware of t � a t  a s  we approach Plato. Each view of Plato bears a cost. 
� �  t he next chapter , I will discuss wha t  costs are worth bearing, 
2 � d �ow t�ey  s hould be borne . 
CHAPTER FIVE: Towards a Useful Approach to 
Plato and Ourselves 
�he grea tes t sin g le difficul ty with a large percentage of the 
ana l ys is on Plato is that it sets out to analyze Plato. In truth , 
a n n l yz ing  Plato can never be separated from analyzing ourselves . 
:mpl ici t i n  the way we view the past · is our own aspirations and 
principles -- wha t we hope to achieve , and wha t  we f eel are important. 
�o d iscuss Plato is to a ttempt to at tain a bit of self-knowledge; 
we owe i t  to ourselves to determine what we want to learn from 
Plato , and why i t  is importan � before we become embroiled in mak ing 
j ud0emen t s  abou t a thi nker who died almos t  2 5 00 years ago. 
From my in troduction onward, I have repeatedly referred to a 
tr2deoff in anal ysis -- to costs we have to bear if we are to make 
any use  of Pl a to ' s  ideas at all. It may come as an anti-climax to 
report that I do not have a solution wh ich eliminates this  tradeoff. 
Ra ther , I will suggest what I believe to be the most effective way 
of  l � 1 rinc wi th  this tradeoff , and of making as much use of Plato ' s  
id ea s  as  po�s ible. I wi l l  begin by elaborating on what I believe 
a n  analy s i s  of the pas t  can achieve; then, I will d iscuss what the 
i�p l icat ions of this pos i tion are for how we are to view political 
tho�� ht; f inal l y, I will provide a conclusion about the most effective 
way of approach ing Pla to. 
1 )  1 : hat  ca n s tudyinq the theory of the past achieve? In my intro­
d u ct ion ,  I expressed �Y belief · that theory ought to help us make 
sense of our wo�ld. There I made w�a t is  really an artifical d is­
t � nction between three advan tages to studying the past: first, it 
helps u s  to see wha t  i t  means to have different perspectives on 
po l i t ics ; second , i t  can hel p  us to unders tand oursel ves; finally, 
( 72 )  
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it can help us to act in the world. Wh ile t hese thr�e can be 
thought of separate ly, they are actually interrelated, and rely, 
in part , on each other. I will examine each in turn , and then dis-
cu s s  this rela tion. 
S tud, ino  theor� helps us  to see what · it means to have differen t 
perspecti ves on politics. As I. M .  Crombie explains, the process  
of  s t udyinq  theory ouqht. to  stimulate our thinking . 65 To  study 
t heory i s  to recogni ze that there are d ifferent assumptions one might 
make about pol .::. tics; i t  is to learn to think creati vely about po­
l i t ics by chall eng ing our assumptions with others� 
S t udying theory , and studying Plato in particular, can also teach 
�.1 s w;-1a t i t  mean s to ha ve "vision"6 6 -- to think of politics as if 
there rea lly were some higher, and perfectly coherent order beh ind 
i t. ,J ust as  one views the motions of the planets di fferently after 
s ee i n� t he vis ion of N ewton or Einstein, and appreciates 9eethoven 
and  :ozart dif ferently a f ter learning the principles of  sonata-allegro 
:orm , one's v i ew of pol itics is never qu i te the same after seeing 
wha t it i s  t o  have a "political vision. " Even if we are to rej ect 
� '. 1 i s  v iew a s  dan0erous , it means something to appreciate what i t  is 
to hold i t. Studying t heory , then, helps us to broaden our perspective 
o� poli t ics. 
S t udyinq theory helps us  to unders tand ourselves. Michael B .  
-, o ;; ter ha s s. ugses ted that " to understand the modern mentality is 
to under s tand oursel ves • • •  why we are civilized [and] what we are 
h '"7 .f: u .::> 1 .L or. To really understand the importance of the ideas 
r: � 
� � I. : :. Crombie . Pla to : The �idwife's Apprentice ( New York : Barnes 
!'.T o'o l e �·nc 1 9�� ) p 1 q,--.. • ' � - • ' �- . V ·::: ' • .,... - �- • 
h c; � � S ee S heldon s .  0olin, Politics and V i sion ( Boston: L i t tle , Brown 
0 co . , � 9 50 ) , especia lly ,  p .  3 3. 
� i  
1... • • '· 1 -·� -, t . -r t f P 1 . t . l '""h - ' t ( C b . d .. 1 ; · . icnae -�·:. :.· os  .er , r .. 1as ers o ,L- o 1 ica .!. ouq n _ am ri ge , r- ass. : -
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we hold, we must unders tand how we came to hold them. Studying 
t he theory of the past provides an ins ig h t  into the his tory of our 
t houg h t  -- how our ideas came to be in fluential, and what · �deas 
los t influence along the way. Moreover, s tudying the past gives 
u s  an ins ig h t  into the analytical ba sis for our though t. It allows 
u s  to  understand what we believe by seeing what it is we are rejec-
t i n G, and why we reject i t . 
S tudying theory helps us  to act. Studying the pas t hel ps us to 
l earn  from sugges tion. Plato sug�ested principles and pol icies 
wh ich we may accept or reject. Additionally , reading the theory 
of t he pas t helps to  provide an insigh t i n to what it means to hold 
cert a in ideas . More importantly , studying the pas t hel ps us to act 
beca use i t  hel ps  u s  to understand oursel ves. We can never make a 
rational choice between two conflicting principles unless we k now 
why we hold t hem and what the costs are if one or the other loses out. 
Ho· ·1 these three arquments are related. Firs t, these three reasons 
a re interrelated in the sen se that they depend on each other. Know­
i �c how to ac t requires that we understand oursel ves, which in � turn 
requ ires that  we have learned to think about politics imaginativel y, 
a n� l earned to challenge our assumpt ions. Yet, the process of learn­
inc  to thi nk about pol itics  and reviewing the pas t can not take place 
�e �oce we have so�e knowled ge of ourselves and how we wish to act. 
A s : men t i oned earl ier, the advice one f inds in Plato, is to some 
ex tent, cond i tioned by what we already think to be valuable. 
� e cond , t hes e are related because they all rest on four impor tan t 
a s sumpt .i on s  abo· :t t he nature of politics .: f irs t ,  that our ideas 
a nd p r i �ciples underlie our political action , second, that ideas 
--- ; , re- r e: i -le ::-, rer.- c- .., o .11 1 ) "' 5  1 6  .,. , ,;, -·- U � _ ..._, ,:> 1 .L ..-' 1. :  ... , PP • .1. - ·") 0 
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are, to some exten t, the product of the way people have thought in 
t he past ; third, that we can look to past to find ideas which we 
recog nize ; and , finally , that  we cannot entirely sever the process 
of look ing for in tel lectual roots from that of decid ing how to act. 
·�o unders tand  what these assumpt ion s  mean, i t  is important to see 
wha t  t hey are rej ecting. 
? )  �!ha t �oes it mea n to look at theory th is way? My first assumption 
re j ects the �el ief tha t fi.l�  ·-political act ion can be reducted to ir­
rat ional impulses. I imply not only tha t  ideas are relevant to 
� c tion, but t ha t  we can see how ideas condition action, and, con­
versely, t h a t action cannot be understood without reference to the 
id eas which underl ie i t. A conf licting view might hold that ideas 
d o  not ef fect action, or that ideas cannot be perceived, and must be 
under s tood as g iven when we examine action. Thus, I believe that an 
attempt to asses s action empirically is neither the only nor even 
� he be s t  way to understand politics. 
- �Y second assumption re j ects any belief that  ideas are born anew 
each generation. I t  implies tha t  Plato is a part  of our modern men­
-:::a l .i. ty ,  a nd tha � \, ';ere is some continu ity to political thought. A 
con flict inq a rg ument might sugges t  that there is only  continuity in 
t �e poli t i cal experience itself ( see pp. 30-3 2), or that there is 
no con t inuity in politics whatever. Th is not to say that there is 
s o;i1e h i s tori ca l  neces s ity or "g reat debate" involved in a "develop­
:-:, e n  t"  of t '.7 ought , but  r:1 ere 1 y t hat id ea s aero s s time a re bu i 1 t , a t  
lea s t  in part, on the ideas which preced�d them. 
y t � ird a s sumption re j ects the v iew that Plato is totally inap­
� l i ca½le to modern times. I t  implies t hat , whatever the differences 
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'-:-,e ::v,een P lato ' s  thour;:�ht and our ovm , that we can find something in 
Plato t!:a t  we can profi t  from. 1-·;oreover , it sugges ts that we can 
l earn  not o nly from what P l a to said , or what P lato meant, but also 
wha t  ? l ato can be mi scon s trued to say or mean, or what we would 
l i �e to infer f rom Plato. One con flicting viewpoint wou ld be Win­
s pear ' s  arg umen t that the ideas of the pas t cannot possibly influence 
� , s today. Another conflicting viewpoint would be any argument which 
s u g0es t s  t hat one particular approach to Plato is the only correct 
way to  examine  h is ideas. Among the analys ts who have mad e  this 
arC". umen t are Popper , Fite , Chapman, Rus s el l  and Strauss. 
A brief. digres sion wi ll help to ill us trate the importance of this 
po � n t. Ma ny  things  he l p  us � to make sense of the world -- even over­
s i �pl i f ications and hal f - tru ths. The se compromi ses on fact, which 
I wi ll refer  to a s  "my th s , "  cannot be re j ected off-hand as false, 
for they generally have something of truth in them, and are ess en tial 
� or providing a sen s e  of purpose and security to individuals. I t  
i s  ::he "myth" t:1at there rea.ll y  is free competition , for exampl e, 
wh i ch helps to perpet ua te competitive activity, and allows individuals 
to �a k e  sen s e  of their part in the economy. I am sugges ting that 
" l e s s  t�an accura te" unders tanding s abou t theoris ts can be used, 
1 5. i-:e n 1 es s t han accura ten unders tandings abou t other aspects of 
o�r  world , to he l p  us  to act. � am also sugges tirig that. politics 
i s  a � a irly compl ex proces s, and that a wide range of differing 
pe rception s of poli tics are useful. I t  is here where my view of 
p o l 1 t 1cs con fl ic t s  with t ha t  of Sparshott ' s  and to some exten t Wolin ' s . 
( s ee pp. 3 8 -4 1. ) . 
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My f ina l ass umption rej ects the idea tha t i nterpretation and 
evalua tion ca n ever be totally separate activi t ies.: A ·; confl i c.t ing 
viewpoint is  impl ied by any writer who pretends towards making a 
completely obj ective account of Pla to's idea s. As I mentioned in  
rny  i ntroduction, what we  find interes ting in Pla to wha t  a ttracts 
our attention, is inev itably affected by the sorts of things we 
are i n teres ted . 68  J. n • I t  is this understa nd ing, plus the understand-
i nc that Pla to's thoug hts and ours are not exact l y �the s ame ( see pp. 
1S-19 ) ,  tha t sugges ts that there is the tradeoff between fidelity 
to Plato's intentions , and fidelity to our concerns , which I have 
def;cribed . 
3 )  '. -: :: a t  is the mos t  effective way of approachinq Plato? Now that 
I have discussed wha t I believe examini ng Plato can achieve, I can 
s ugges t what way of approaching Plato will achieve the most. As 
should be clear , the idea of a "mos t effective way" is actually a 
m i s unders tand ing. As I have brought up in the course of my examina­
t ion , quite a few dif ferent a pproaches provide us with different 
sor t s  of u seful informa tion. What makes an approach particularly 
u s e :-=- u1  is  not so much wha t information i t  seeks, but the recognition 
hy the analyst of the inherent limita t ions of the approach , and the 
need for tolerance of other approaches . These two ideas , which I 
C <?. 1 1  nself-con scious nes s "  and n tolerance,' '  . .' will be examined, in turn. 
� e l �-Con scio '. • s ness . Th i s  involves being aware of the assump tions 
on e makes , and wha t those assumptions mean . -- not only the way they 
expand our view of politics , but also the way they limit i t. Self­
consciou snes s is  impor tant for three reasons. F i rs t, it provides 
r- o  
'"' · _; T. t i s i n t ere s ting to note th a t w r i t er s 1 i k e Dickins on and Lev inson 
had  cenerally as sumed t hat P l a to would be in favor of mechani za tion 
and  econo�ic expan s ion ,  and that i t  was not really until the need for 
l i �i t s  became a top i c  of d iscus s ion that analysts began to see some 
o�  t h i s  argument in P lato's dialogues . 
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� he means by wh ich arguments can be compared. When the assumptions 
and limi tat ions are c l ear, readers can w�tgh the analyst ' s  perceptions 
of politics agains t their own , and determine whether an argument is 
convincing or not. I f  they fail to be convinced, they can still 
pro� i t  from learning  what they are rej ecti ng, and why. It is when 
one  ha s to infer a s sumptions from the argument, as One .muse for 
Cha p�an and F ite , tha t one can never know why an approach ought to 
be accepted or re j ected. 
S econd , when as sumptions are put forth, the reader can j udge 
whether an analys t  ha s been true to these a s sumptions. If one is 
to learn wha t  i t  means to make a particular a ssumption about poli­
t i cs , this sort of test is es sential. Yet, in an approach like that 
of Chap�an and P i te ,  as opposed to Winspear ' s, for example, one 
i s  presen ted only with the conclusions , and not the grounds on which 
t�e conc l u s ions have been drawn. 
Third , beinS7 con scious of a ssumptions and limita tions allows 
J� ·--� e  !..'."eader  to  f it t '. 1e approach into a broader framework. When the 
s peci f ic area of politics tha t is being illuminated is spelled out , 
readers can know what  an approach can gain , and what sorts of ideas 
can only be learned through different approaches. When writers 
are  not conscious  of the l imitations of their arg ument, they imply 
t � a t t hey  are describing everying that needs to be described. As 
a result , an  approach lik e Popper ' s must be accepted by itself , 
ev·en :i. f  .i. t does not illum inate all we w:i. sh  to know. 
I n  s hort , self-consciousness is es sential if views are to be 
. . · . 
t .J.-
' 
• f 1 . t b d f �.-F� 1 0 nec1 a.0a J. n r::. 0 1..  .. ners , J. • cone us ions are o e assesse . or con-
s i s t ency , a n d  i f  a nalyses are to be fit into · a broader framerwork 
o�  t1nd ers t2n d i n�.  Sel f-consciousnes s i s  not, however, all that is 
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Tolerance. We must be toleran t both of P lato h imself, and of 
the pos sibility that.· : at-ber approaches to Plato can b 2  useful. Too 
o� ten  a nal y s i s  of P lato i s  s een as a wrestling match which end s when 
P lato is pinned to the mat � Sim ilarly, to gain from Plato, is not 
to seek to defend his repu t:a :1: :1.on ag·ainst all possible challenge. 
,}ohn ::j ild is correct in suggesting that raising a generation to 
ha te Plato is someth ing of a pyrrhic v ictory over the past, 69 but 
un l es s  we are wil ling to admit that Plato said th ings which can be 
bo ��  d i sagreed with,  and interpreted in quite a few useful ways, 
,,;e are cheating oursel ves. 
��1mnr� - This has brought me, fortunately enough, full circle, 
ba c1 :  to the argument I began both this chapter and this paper with. 
�o analyze Plato we must be aware that we analyze ourselves, and 
m'. i st a c t  accord ingly. I have suggested what we can gain from the 
pn s t ,  and have d i scus sed what this view means . I believe that to 
l ea rn from P l a to we must be wil l ing to accept the cost of analysis, 
a n d  be very con scious of these costs, so that others can decide 
whether they are worth bearing. We must also be tolerant , both 
of the  poss ib i l ity that Plato' s ideas differ from our own, and the 
pos s i bi l ity t ha t  ot hers may view Plato d ifferentl y. The test of 
an  approach is not whether P l ato is better described, he has been 
dead too long to  ob j ect to any i nterpretation ; the test must be 
whe ther P l ato has  helped us  to understand ourselves. 
,-:, Q " � ,:Toh n 1.-J i 1 d , p. 5. 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION - THE PARABLE OF THE ELECTION 
Last November ,  there was a referendum in Philadelphia to decide 
whether the city charter should be changed to allow the mayor -­
F rank Rizzo -- to run for a third term. Despi te the obvious parti­
san is sues at  stake , advertisements on the eve of the elect ion 
cenerally did not mention the mayor by name. Rather, they took 
the following form : 
?hose arg u ing  .ill t he charter change beg an by pointing out that 
''over 200 years ago , American gathered in Philadelphia to fight for 
f:.--eedom. ' '  �::-hey wen t  on to add , "isn't it surprising, that Philadel­
phians  are s t ill figh ting for freedom? That' s what charter change 
i s  a l l abou � you know , whether you have the freedom to vote for 
,1hom you wan t  to. You know the answer is, 'yes, � and you know that's 
how you ' ll vot e  on charter change. Let's bring tha t  charter up to 
d a te. It ' s  about time ! " 
· .. ' hose arguing acain s t the change began by poin t ing  out that " no t  
even the P re s ident of t he Uni ted S tates can run for a third term, " 
2.nd added t ha t  "noth i ng is truer said than  power corrupts, and abso­
l ut e · �ower corrupt s absolutely. Philadelphians know that no one 
ma n i s  so important that he should be granted the power to rule 
i ndef ini tely . ,, .  The advertisement concluded wi th  an appeal for 
j r: cl l viduals to defend their  l iberty , and oppose charter change. 
·_ · he question tha t s truck me at the time, is how does one go- · ., about 
choosing between t hese two appeals. Both s trike chords deep in the 
s p i r i t  of the i r  audience ; both seem true enough on their face . It  
is  on l y  when we k now why such appeals do "strike chords" and what 
7: :1 e .s e  "chor.d s n are, t hat  we can make a decision between these two . 
: opefu lly, an examin a t ion of Plato, other thinkers of the past , 
and  even ana l ys t s  of our own time , can help us to make this dec i sion. 
( 80 )  
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY 
:n an effort to save s pace in the text, brief descriptions of 
the major work s discus sed in Chapters Two, Three and Four are pro­
vided here. The reader is  warned to be vary of my tendency to lapse 
into subjective comments on the merits of the arguments and styl e 
of  argumentat ion used in some of the books cited. These descrip­
t ion s are meant to familiarize the reader with my viewpoint, as 
mn c'1 as  wi tl"1 the argumen t s  of the analysts who have been discussed 
in t his paper .  My review .wi l l  be d ivided into the three areas of 
di scussion examined in Chapters Two through Four. 
(CHAPTER TWO : I s  Plato Worth Studying? ) 
' 'irtual l y  all of the work s used in this  paper make at least some 
commen t abou t Plato's depth of ins ight, talent in dramatic style 
:- ,r consis tency i n  presentation. �.,-aJorks that s pend a good deal of 
s pace on the s ubject of " Plato as a thinker, " however, are few in 
On one end of the s pectrum is,  Lucian, Plato � Greek I'"Iora l s  
:)y . ;ohn Jay Chapman ( Cambridge , r·:Iass. : The R iverside Pres s, 193 1) .  
:: :1 2 pn·ia n a :.-s1ues tha t P l a to "takes our mind off our troubles, " but 
i s  much overra ted as a thinker. Chapman argues that Lucian deserves 
? l a to ' s reput a tion for depth of ins ight, while P lato deserves Lucian's 
repu ta tion as an  intellec !  .. :Jal lightweight. Specifical ly, he fau lt s 
�-! l a te for bei ng a "romant ic visionary, tt who d id not realize that 
·: · . e onl y truth  is  a moral truth which is understood through "common 
sen se , " and not through ref lection. Chapman is a l so offended by 
w:12  t he believes to be P l a to's "obscene and dangerou s "  approval of 
�ederas ty in work s  lik e t he Sympos ium. 
( 81 ) 
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In a simi l a r  vein is the more sophisticated attack made by 
'.)a rner Pi te in �::J� P l atonic Leoend (Ne\"/ York: Charles Scribner's 
:3ons , 1 9 3 4 ) . In t his w-:>rk, F'i te sets out to di spel l the "di vine" 
image he believes writers like Jowett and Shorey have g iven P lato. 
He arg ues tha t  P la to was , in most ways, simply unexceptional : that 
P l ato's purpose was merely to further aristocratic (or, perhaps 
more accurately , elitist ) ends over those of the general population , 
tha t P lato substituted a view of "technological efficiency" for the 
1 1 common sense" of the layman, that Plato's literary talents fel l  
well  below those of George E liot or Thackeray, and that Plato's 
moral s were chi ldish and effeminate. 
: lost of the writers who attack P lato's ideas and their influence, 
however, have a respect, and , in some cases, even a fear of the 
powerfulness o�  P l a to's t h ink ing. This argument is expres sed most 
cle2rly by t :. I .  Finley in Chapter VI of his Aspects _2i Antiguit)!: 
( N e'd York: The �/ iking P ress , 1968). Finley argues that we have 
" no ri9ht  to reduce ('_p 1a toj to just another good chap with queer 
i d ec� {.:::. 0 He d irect s  his at:  tack not to P lato ' s "enemies" but P lato ' s 
" def enders " ( �Jrobab l y Rona l d  Levinson) , and argues that Plato's 
a rg ument is  powerfu l ,  intell igent, seductive, and , for the�e reasons, 
extremely d angerous. 
A d i f feren t sort of argument is made by A l vin w .  Gouldner in 
: n ter P l ato ( New York : Basic Book Publishers , 1965). Gouldner , 
1 5 1:e Fin ley think s tha t  P lato was wrong to some extent -- especia l ly 
i n  2 pologizinq for slavery. Gouldner, however, believes that Plato's 
::-,:, · , io , 1 s .i n tel l iaence s hould lead us to a sk the question, "how did 
a thinker who wa s so insi9 htful come : to feel this way'l 1J "  (For 
· v) '.�P. on - .  ou 1 c ner ' s a.rqumen  t see . pp. 8 9-90) . 
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The fol lowing is a list of other analysts mentioned in this 
chapter, and where more complete discuss ions �f their arguments can 
be found : Karl Popper -- pp. 84, 9 4. 
Sheldon �ol in -- p. 91. 
Leo Strauss -- pp. 97-98.  
R. H. s .  Crossman -- pp . 94-9 
Alban D. Winspear -- p. 83. 
( CHAPTER THREE : Can We Compare Pla to ' s  Thought to Our Own? � 
: uch as ana lysts have often failed to be self-conscious, they 
have 9enerally been consc ious of the position of the individual 
they are writi ng about. Most of the works used include at least 
some i ntroductory comment on why studying Plato is important. Those 
tha t s pend some space on the issue of comparabil ity, wi Ll be discussed 
i n  two sectionB : 
( Sect ion One :  Plato and Time) 
'" he s trongest argumen t for the lim itations inherent in trying · ·to 
s pan the gap of time comes in the perspective of Alban Dewes Winspear. 
=::n �- ' :1e C,enes is .£f Plato's Thouoht  ( New York : Dryden Press, 1 9 4 0 ) , 
1. ·:· i npear takes F'i te ' s analys is one step further to argue essentially 
tha t there is  no timeless message to be gained from reading the 
a n cient Greeks. Winspear seems to have both a Hegelian view of 
h i storical development, and a Marxist idea that hi storical condi­
t i ons �ave been s uch tha t  it has been impossible for anyone to 
r i se  above their own narrow , partisan interests. He attempts to 
n s ee !?late in the 'l ig ht of history'" rather than of ' pure reason. ' "  
1:Jha t he finds i s  a petty aristocrat . who followed in the . right-wing 
foo t s teps  of the Pythagoreans -- and one of its most conservative 
-84-
members , Socrates h imself -- in reas serting the lost privileges 
of his own cl a s s  to dom inate A thens. The uniquenes s  of Plato , in 
W i npear t s eyes , l ies not in any abil ity to transcend hi s historical 
circumstances, but merel y in an ability to take a broader view 
of h i s  pl ace in histroy than most m6dern plural is t s  do . Other 
analysts who do not have Winspear's view of history , but who expres s  
reservation s about try ing to s tem the gap o f  time include: Ernest 
·, ark e r , P_r:os ser F rye ,  .John Hallowel l ,  G. c .  Field and Charles Mc!lwatn . 
K arl P opper agrees w ith W inspear • s  description, but not with 
: : i n s pear's argument .  In I.b.£ Open Society � lli _81emies ( Princeton: 
P rinceton Univers ity Pres s ,  1945, 19 5 0) ,  Popper c l 9ims that Plato 
n outchered" the arguments of his contemporary democrats like Calli­
cles . Popper , however , uses this  argument as evidence of what Plato's 
i dea s lead to, and� not as i !ao expl �nat i on of ��er, �hi s tdeas �eame from. 
P opper bel ieves t ha t  Plato is  representative of a "way of thinking " 
t ha �  has existed in all societies since tribal t imes ; this view of 
: r rep�css ion " he a s sociates with Plato, he call s the thinking of 
t '"i e  1 1 closed society . r r  Popper argues tha t this sort of thinking has 
�een  i n  a con tinual batt le with the forces of the "open society" 
�e�J!'e s en ted by nl ibera l-democracy. " (For a further discus sion of 
P opper and s imil ar arguments, see pp . 9 2 -9 5 ) . 
John T. �ookman makes no reference to Plato's h is torical circum­
s tances a t  a ll.  In I d. s  a rticle, " Pl ato on P;ql it ical Obligation" 
( Wes tern Polica l Quarterly , 2 5 (July, 1 972) , pp . 260-267), he 
s u0�es t s  tha t Pl a to's premi ses may be more useful for developing a 
t !1eory of ob liqation than the current a t tempts · to def i rie '.  f·.r:e-edom �of 
s peech are. Bookman suggests t hat Pl ato is useful for i solating 
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a nd distinguis hing between philosophers who are not bound by 
law , but have an ethical responsibility to the state -- and the 
other citizens -- who are obl igated to foll ow , the · 1aws as l ong, 
a nd�onl y a s long , as  the state fosters cooperation among souls. 
A si�ilar approach , on a somewhat different question, is present�d 
by  Charle s Howard l"'!cI 1wain in the first two chapters of � Growth 
of  Politic al �'houoht in lli � ( New York : The Macf-Ullan Co , 1932) .  
cI  lwain begins by suggesting tha t \.tt.re central question of all pol 1-
U. ca. 1 f: ho1.HJ h t:  has  been "what can make it legitimate to have man 
born free  and everywhere lie in chains? . ' ' Mcilwain finds Plato ' s  
a n swer rela tively similar to Calvin ' s  -- it is legitimate if the 
bes t -- t he "el ect" -- rule. He suggests th�t this led Plato to 
focus on the f ew w:10 were capable of rule , and on the;:-;possibility 
of order i ng the s tate to ach ieve perfection. Thus, �cilwain analyzes 
� l 2 t o  not t hroug� the framework of his metaphysics , nor through his 
h i s �or ical con text, but t hrough his answer to the question of legi-
: our wr i t ers who al so divorce Plato from the Athens of his day, 
are Prosser Hal l  Frye, Roger Chance, G. Lowes Dickinson and Mul ford 
Q .  :·3 i h l ey .  F'rye , in his essay , "Plato " (� University Stud ies of 
� 'Jn lvers i ty £f. N ebraska ( Lincoln: The University Publishers, 19 3 8 ) 
v· . 3 8 , ;')o. 1-2 , pp. '1.-113 ) ,  sugges ts that Plato is clear mirror of 
01.Jr time s. He suqoests that the Greek po litical experience was ba­
s ical l y  similar to our own -- they had great talkers, were thoroughly 
d e�ocratic , venal , d ishonest , extravagant, conce i t ed , and had poli­
t i cs a s  their nemesis. F·rye sugges ts that Plato defined j ustice 
a ccord i ng to obliga tions not privileges and detested excessive 
£ �eedo� and  t h e fa i l ure t o  recognize vul garity. Frye bas ically 
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a,J.!:"'ees with Plato ' s  program, but sugges t s  that Plato was too "car­
r ied away" wi th  his project. The ideas 1� :::ye disagre·es  with are 
P l a to's ef for t to e l iminate al l liberty and "infuse the governmen t 
\·,' I ·> h  morality , " a s  wr� :Ll a s  the "mons tros i ty" of Plato ' s  plan for 
using women to govern the s tate. 
Roger Chance's view of P lato is quite different .  His book, Until 
P h ilosophers � Kings { London : University of London Press, Ltd. , 
1 9 2 � ) attempts to rediscover the roots  of the political ideas for 
w� ic�  he and ot hers had f ought in the Fir s t  Yorld War. His thinking 
s eems to have been influences  by some of the ideas of the social gos­
pe l �ovemen t and certai n views of  technocracy. The ideas he finds 
echoed i n  Plato's thought include the quest for the Ci ty of God, 
the d i s t in c tion �etween the abstract concepts of Good and Evil, and 
2 rej ection of :; o�i al contract theory. Chance di sagrees with what 
'1e cal l s t he  " s ta t i c  at t i t ude toward life" found in Plato's ethics, 
{.� ;x' v. d .. -:.h t he " d i s cred ited notion of state sovereignity " found in 
� l a to ' s political ideas. He argues that a balance mus t  be struck 
be tween P l a ::o's authori tarianism and the "excessive freedom" of 
ictorian  England. 
G. Lowe s Dick inson wro te two work s that were used in this s tud y • 
.. , ' r. • � A -r !.. ""I O O O ,,... ( L d • ("" e ..... A 1 1  ("I U • L t d . "f 9 3 2 ) n e ., i rs L- , __ L e  r ..s__ .,_ e a r s  on on . :; o"" g e en c..: nw1 n , . , , .. . . 
crea tes a dialogue between Plato and a modern Englishman, with the 
curiou s  name of Philalethes. While some of the convers a t i on i s  
spent on d i s cus s i ng w: . � t  Plato meant , Phi lalethes does mos t o f  the 
t alk i n9. � he E ncl i s h�an manages to con vince Plato of the vi rtues 
of some of t he i nst i tuti ons  of modern society including the League 
o�  : 1 2. t ions  and modern technology. Philalethes also gets the better 
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of ar011men ts on censor s h i p  and eugen ics. In the other work , Plato 
a nd 1 -a s  D ialoo ue s (N ew Yorlc : W . W. Norton 2:r. Co. , Inc. , 1932) , 
--
D ick i nson presen t s  a somewhat more id ealized analysis of P l ato .  
'. i e swJ �:es t. s  tha t there i s  "no topic of importance wh ich we discuss 
tha t P lato did not d iscuss too , " and likens P lato's experience of 
wr i t i ng af ter the Peloponnesian War to the experience of writing 
a :<- ter the ?irs t ·�·..ror ld  ':,Jar.. D ickinson examines the R epubl ic and Laws, 
a nd comes to the concl usion that P l a to died "in the faith" that 
h i s  Cretan cit y m i ght actual ly be established. Dickinson a lso 
2 ur0e s t s t ha t  politi�s w� s not P l ato's primary concern -- that his 
P1a i. n  preoccupa tions  were as a philosophe r and a " lover. " 
Mt1lford Q. S i bley' s  connection wit h  the � e  wr iters is somewhat 
-t e n 1 .1ou s. In "T :1e '. :'.elevance o:f C l assical Po l .i. t i cal  Theory for 
:�.-- cono--iy , ':-echno l oc: Y , and Eco lo,3 �' , "  (Delivered at the  1972 Annua l 
ee t i n� of t h e  Amer ican Pol i tical Science A ssociation (Washing ton : 
�he Amer ica n Polit ical Scien ce Associa tion, 1972 ) ) , he does make 
a n  arg ume n t  for the,· ways in  which the probl ems P l ato faced were 
s i� i l a r  to our own , and  it is on that basis that  he has been included 
�ere. The prob lem s we share with P lato , according to Sibley, include 
L �e p6pu lat i on problem , the na tural resources question, and issues 
c oncern i ng �oney , commerce , ecology, nature and s tabili ty. Sibley 
s ees  much of t hese  problems arising after the imperialism and ac-
q u  �- s i t i  vene s s  of A t hens brou9ht i t  into ·i- h�: d�sasibrous war with 
3 ?a r � a .  �·or more d i scus sion on Sibl ey's argumen t, see pp . 100-101. 
···· 11ree wr i ter s  who exam .i ne P l ato's env i ronment with the spec ific 
{ �
1 · e n t i on  of i n � erpre t inc P l a t o  in lig h t  of his historica l circum­
s �� 2nces  are  r: r ic : ! a velock , G. C. Field and Werner J aeger. Have lock 
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wrote two work s which are somewhat d ifferent in character , if not 
in a pproach. r_�'he f irst , � Liberal Temper in Greek Pol i tics (New 
H aven: Yale U n ivers i ty Press , 1 9 57), takes  up part of Winspear's  
arsument , bu t not f rom a perspective of historical development . 
I n  this book , Ha ·relock a t temp t s  to rediscover the democratic el ements 
i n  Pla to ' s A thens , and f inds i t  in  the sophi sti Plato criticized. 
: ie  conclude s , on somewhat speculative evidence, tha t Plato misre­
pres ented democratic thinkers l ike Gorgias , .  P rotagoras and Thrasyma­
c h u s , and  tha t  Pl a to was a propagandist for the cons ervative cause . 
U n l ike 1,··J i ns pear , however , Havel ock does not disparage on Plato's 
i1 sefulnes s or even really his motives . He argues that Plato should 
no t be expec ted to reproduce accurately the arguments of those with 
w�om he di sagreed. 
i ·y references to Havelock in the paper, however , have generally 
had  h is la ter work -- P reface 1£ Plato ( N ew York: The Universal 
L i  '.)ra ry , 1. 9 6  · ::· ) - - in m ind. In t h l $  work , Havelock examines Plato' s 
e:i ·d. ron::1 en t t o  see 'dha t  rrd . s h t  have l ed hlm  to suggest censoring the 
poe t s. I n  an arg umen t  which is better evidenced than that made in 
t �e ea rlie r work , !i a velock presen ts an extensive j ustification of 
th i s  pol icy. � ! i s  arg ument rests primar ily on a discuss ion of the 
·-: i.) c ::b l :�. zing af fects the constant repi ti tion of Homer ' s . poe try must 
have had in the "ora.l culture" of ancient Greece . 
In  
,"' 
. ....... . 
P l a to and H is Contemporaries (London: Methuen 8, Co . , L td . , 19 30 ) , 
7 iel d presents an approach which puts Plato in an even better 
F i eld accepts  as g iven that there is a universal element 
� o  ?la to ' s  writing, and pl aces a heavy presumption against arguments 
1: 1
1·1 ic :1 see 1 ::: to tmpute ba.d motives to Pla to based on what Fiel d bel ieves 
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to  be tenuous a s s umption s . Field believes that Pla to ' s view of the 
unity of t he state transcended partisan considerations and so had 
n o t hing in common wi t h  the oligarchic parties in A thens . He plays 
down oos s ible incon s istencies between Plato and other S ocratics ' 
. 
( Ja r t i cu l ar l y  Xenophon) as pri�ari ly differences in emphas is. 
r1oreover , F ield  imputes a harmless motive to Plato in using real 
n a�es for character� in h i s  dia l ogues; he calls this a common Greek 
pract ice , a nd bel ieves that there is i nsufficient evidence to prove 
!.. ' � u � ;. : 1 a �·-o i ntende0 to ma sk  his contemporaries. 
�erner J aeger goes even further to understand P lato's weaknesses 
( 1:Jhere t hey exist ) in  the "sympathetic" light of a. s tudy of h is 
env i ro �men t ,  i n  � is work Pa ideia  (New York: Oxford ! !niversity Press , 
... ,_71 ::: 1 -1 9 (:. 3) . ,7aecer ' s 1-oots lie in the Hegelian id ealism prominent 
.i.n the  ··::er�an  Uni versities of the late 1 9 th Century . In Paideia , 
':-ie exam i n e s  G reek cult ure and links Plato with the greatest ideals 
of  G r e ek think ing , and wi t h  the ' 'li felong struggle of man to free 
: 1 i. ni s e l f  f ror.1 ignorance. " Jaeger holds Plato more or less guil tless 
f o �  a t tack ing t he poets , by arguing that such assaults were in the 
t �ad it i on of wr i ters like Xenophanes , Heraclitus � Aeschylus and 
·�) :i ndur. 1. i nlike Havel ock, .Jaeger calls Plato ' s  depreciation of the 
/. !<-:en i o. n pri n c irle s  of written law and equal rig hts an. "exaggeration 
,;-.,rh 5- ch ca n be 1..1 nderstood only if we recall the sp:h-:itual dangers of 
/\ 1. v i. n  . •  C o u l d n e r  i s  n o t  very concerned with romanticizing either 
a � c �en t reece or P l a t o  himself. I n  E nter Plato (supra. ) ,  he openly 
s e t s  out  t o  j ud 9 e  the  Greeks in general, and Plato and Aristotle 
i n  particu l ar , by their  f idelity to the standards which we modern 
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observers believe to be correct. He justifies this by arguing 
that the his torian of social theory s hould acknowled ge that he is, 
inevitably, a critic on what he/she reports. Accordingly , while 
he adm i res Pl ato for provid ing the first comprehensi ve d iagnosis 
o�  the human condition, he admonishes Plato for accepting the 
pr i nciple that government ou�ht to be restri cted to a small group 
and  for accepting the in stitut ion of slavery. Gouldner bel i eves that 
i J: :: . s P l a to ' s a pol oqy  for sl avery, and not any partisans hip in  h is 
wr i t i ng s , which represents the T Ttrag ic flawn in  Plato's analys is. 
E rnest 3arker also presents a judgement on Plato's arguments. 
I :-1  h i s work , �  P ol J.tical �houqht of Plato .§1!l9. Aristotle (London: 
:· I e t.huen , · Co. , 1. 9 0 6 ) , :3arker criticizes Plato for using false 
wres tinr the righ t  of making government from the 
people , for faili ng to real ize that the roots of the present l ie 
i n  the pa s t , for fail ing to recognize the need for ind ividual per­
s on2. l i ty ,  and :=or insti t u ting a "tyranny of principles. " The per­
s pect i ve 3arker applies to this argument i s  s imilar to Goudd ner's 
� n  t l1a t he a t tempt s  to analyze Plato's intellectual environment, 
i n  a n  ef fort  to exp l a i n  wha t Plato meant, before criticizing these 
7 r1 ea s .  
( Sect ion ?wo : Pl a to and Pol itics) 
T :1e mos t importa n t  of the writers who call Plato "apolitical" are 
��. 2. Sparshobt, and Sheldon Wolin. Sparshott, in h is essay, �Plato 
2 s  a n  2.n ti-F ol i tical Think er, " (in Gregory Vlas tos, ed.,  Plato, f::. 
Collection  of CriU.cal E s says ( Garden City, New York: Doubleday & ·. 
Co. , : � c. , 1 9 7 1 ) , v. 2, pp. 2 14-21 9) , s uggests the Plato ��s psy­
cholot;:: ical l y  i n capable of acquiescing to compromise. Sparshott 
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�e l i eves tha t po l i t ic s  i nvol ves con f l i c t , fl uR , and d i vergen t opin­
i on s  a nd th a t  P l a to t r i ed to e l imi na t e  these  throug h " soci a l  en-
�, i n eer i nq . " He con c l ud e s  by sugges t i ng tha t po l i t i cs i s  a f ie ld 
where deci s i on s  cannot be based on k nowl edge , a nd that  P l a to ' s 
ph i l o sopher has not h i ng t o  con t r ibute to such a f i e l d . 
A s i mila r , and  be tter  rea soned argumen t i s  mad e by She l don Wol in 
i n  r oli t i cs and Vis i on ( Boston: Litt l e , Brown P Co , 1960 ) .  W o l i n  
2 d 1·:·t i re��:1. P l a to for i s o l a t i ng the " pol i t i ca l "  a s  a f i e ld for s tudy , 
and  argues tha t the orig in of many of the terms we u se i n  pol i t i cs 
� a tes  from P l a to ' s work . Wo l i n a l so bel ieves  t h� t s tudying P la to 
i s  L.1por ta n t  ._--: or ·. - r, ders tand i ng wha t i t  i s  to have a " pol i t ica l  
\ 'L° d. on . : r O n  the  o t her hand , however ,  he bel i eve s tha t P l a to s ta ted 
·c h e  c l a s s i c  ca se aqa i n st " po l i t i c s , "  by trying to e l imina te " conf l i ct "  
2. s 5_ f i t  were a " d i sea s e . "  Wol i n  a l so makes  a s trong case  for t he 
cu·r trnen �� t h a t  " expert n k nowl edc:1e  i s  not  t he on l y  rel eva n t  sort i n  
� � e  pol i t i ca l  a rena ; he a rgues  tha t  P l a to ' s fa i l ure to see t he im­
por t a nce of  t he a<Jreemen t  by popul a r  con s ensus  on " t ruths " in b i nd i ng 
:- he  s t a t e to0 e t. he.r. wou l d  have doomed h i s  Republ i c  t o  d i ssol u t ion . 
s 0 �0 o�  t � is v i ew of  po l i t i c s  can a l so be seen in two es says  by 
' 2. ync  A .  c� . Leys  ( "Wa s P l a to N on-P 0 l i t i ca l ? "  and "A n Af terthough t" 
:L n  "H a s  tos , Op . fi t . ,  pp . 166-1 7 3  and pp . 184-186 res pect ive l y ) , 
a s  wel l as .in 3arker ( s uera. ) ,  Chance ( suera. ) , Gouldner (supra. ) ,  
and I .  : · : .  Crombi e , P l a t o : The r·-U dwi f e ' s �pren t i ce ( New York : Barnes  
a nd ;--: obl e , I n c . , 1 9 6 ,1: ) . 
::avid  ren e , i n  tl§ll I n  H i s  ? r i de ( C h icago : Un iver s i ty of C h i cago 
. 1 1- c s s � '1 9 5 0 )  su ·�·i qes t s  tha t P l a to pre sented a fundamen ta l l y d i f feren t 
, · -r_ e\·.' of po l i t i c s  t : : a n  our s . Grene argues tha t P l a to ' s  l i fe ca nnot  
�e s ep2 rat ed f rom h i s t h ou ? h t , and h i s pol i t i ca l  vi ews cannot be 
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severed from t heir in terdependen t relation wi th the rest of his 
ph ilosophy. Grene believes that Plato's conception of the rela-
:: ion between the eternal forms and  all aspects of thought "came 
to  h i m  i n  a s .ingle moment of illumination." Accordingly, Grene 
� inds a con tinuity in all of Pl a to' s works in the constant rela­
t ion ship between the soul of the individual, trie state and the Forms. 
( CHA PTE R FOUR : H ow S h ou l d  l_.•,Je V iew P l a t o '� ) 
Pla to ' s legacy i s , of course ,  qui te diverse. As with my summaries 
o�  analysts in t he last chapter , I will divide my discussion i nto 
� he sect ions found in  the ,aper i t self. 
( � ect i on Cne : Pl a to a s  a ' ' Total i tar i a n " (or a "Democrat") ) 
A s  � litler beg a n  to r i se to power , t here was a shi f t  in the n a ture 
a� t�e d i s cus s i on from a t t empts  to look to Plato for justica tion 
� or �: he ideals tha t were foug ht  for i n  the "Great Har " to attempts 
t o  ci e t erm ine P l a to ' s  culpability as the mentor for the new totalitari­
a �  2 ta 1: 0s. This debate con tinued well in to the 1940's and early 
1 n � O ' s ,  a n d  �o�c of . the arguments are s ti l l the subject of discussion 
t oday ( s ee summary of Ophuls, p. 101) . E xponents of the view of 
: ' P l a t o as a totalitarian "  include Renford Bambrough, Thomas Lang·dn, : ;  
r-.. -:-• ,. J;:: i r  
/ 
i1. . t· • .  -. L-red , ·,oernle, Bertra nd Russell, Karl Popper a nd 
� .  : ; .  s .  Crossma n; opponents of these arguments include Joh n  
· i 2.l l m· .. re l 'l,  H. 1:� . /\cton ,  a n d  r'�onald Lev i nson ( to be discussed here) 
and  several other analyst s  to be examined under the next section. 
:1� n  r r p 1 a to' s . odern Friends a nd Enem ies , "  a.n introductory essay 
t· o 11 ·i s a n t holo�-y  en t itled Pla to , Peeper � Politics ( Cambridge, 
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: nsland : H e f f e r  � S on s , L td . , 196 7 ) , Renford Bambroug h tries to 
clari fy some of the poin ts  in the dispute over Plato as a totali­
t2 rian. : .. le arg ues tha t  the types of at tacks made on P lato's use 
of  censorship and " l ying " fail to put P lato's ar·(_jumen t in the 
perspective of h i s  me taphysical belie� in the existence of an 
absol ute trut h. 3ambrough con tinues , however, by arguing that 
P l ato ' s  assumpt ion tha t  there is such a discoverable truth is 
i n correct. As such , he claims that Plato is rig h tly connected 
',ri t h  tota l i ta rianism , not because he would agree wi th the Fascists 
( or ,  i n terestin�ly enoug h, the Catholics ) over what t�11 th is to 
be  d i scovered , bu t because he bel ieves tha t s uch a tru th � be 
d i s covered. Thoma s Landon Thorson a1so links totalitarianism to 
� �c reli a n ce on absolute s tandards in the introduction to his 
a n t holoq y , P l a to : Totalitard f1. n _££ Democrat? ( Englewood Cliffs, New 
, ·· e r s ey : P ren t ice ! Iall, I nc. , 196 3). I n  a speech given April 193 7, 
en t i t led : , woul d  I) lato have Approved of the National -Socialist S tate" 
( in 3ambroug h ,  pp. 2 0- 3 6 ) , R. F. Al fred Hoernl' suggests that Plato 
\·JO ' .l l d  ha-:e l ik e  � i i tler' s r.1e thods ( ! ) , i f  not I-: :d: ler' s ideas. 
Lord Sertrand � uss ell reaches a similar, if not quite so extreme 
conclu sion i n  C� ha pters 1 1- 1 5  of his A H is tory _Qi Wes tern Phi losophy 
( New �ork : S i mon � Schuster, 1945). Russell argues that the guar-
� i a n  c l ass in P lato's �epublic is a class apart from the rest of 
soc i e t y  -- l ike the Jes u i ts in Paraguary or the Communist Party�in 
t he Soviet Uni on .. ;-;. u s sel 1 describes the four cardinal virtues 
o f  t h is c l a s s  � s �ravi ty , courage , decorum and the qual i ty cul tivated 
i:1  educa t ion. A" p!1 ilosopher, ":1ussell sugges ts, is one who agrees 
, .J i. :_. h F' 1 a to , a n d " j u s  t i ce I I  i s "mi n di n <; one ' s bus in e s s • " R us s e 1 1  
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argues that P lato's s tate achieves succes s in war a'nd enough to 
eat, and not h i ng more. Finally, he concludes, with a small bit of 
irony , tha t  P l a to's ideas are unverifiable because, if one were to 
s pend a s  much  t i me a s  Plato dema nd s, on ma thema t i cs  ( and Greek) , 
one would n ever ha ve t i me t o  a na lyze Plato. 
i� ar l P opper ( suora. ) raises some sim ilar arguments in h i s  inter­
pre t a t i on o f  wh a t  P l a t o wrote .  The dif ference between Popper and 
� u s s e l l is  th a t  r opper t r i e s to make a Qenera l  s t a t emen t  about 
� l 2 to ' s theor e t i cal idea s a s  well. P opper believes that P l a to ,  
;:') l l S !:-:_ e a. 1.. 1 1 H e s e l a nd :; a c< a re part of  t rad i t i on  of t o t a l i tarian i sm ,  
l i n 1 : ed by a co:-:1mon b e l ief  in wha t he ca l l s  " h i s t or i c i sm" -- the i d e a  
!- hc1 ·�. s cientific me t hod s c a n  be used t o  und ers tand the laws of human 
d e ,te l opme n t a nd predict the future of m a nk i nd . H e  f i nd s  "histori­
c5- s rn "  i n  P l a t o ' s vlew of t h e  d ecay of s t a te s  and i n  h i s  d e s i re t o  
'
1 c1. r.res t  a ll change" t hrough social e n g i neeri ng . Popper argue s  
� h u �  P l a to m i s t a k en l y  a s ked "who should r u l e7' , '1  rather than " how can 
we org a n i ze the s ta t e  so tha t bad, or i ncompe ten� r u l e r s  d o  not do 
:: oo ::1ud1 d a m a q e?· "  a n d , a s  s uch , fa i l ed to recog n i ze the need for 
f e�ocra tic i n s t i tut ion s as  a check agains t tyranical rule. Finally, 
· np :'er S \. l C '_� c s t s  t h a �: P l a t o ,  i n  h i s  re U. a n ce on ab s o l u t e  a n swe r s  a nd 
s o c i a l e n � i n eer i ng , actually betrayed Socrates -- the man who knew 
· · he  d i. f :f e ren cc, :)e tween P l a to a nd S ocra t e s  i s  of even g rea ter  con­
cei:-n  't:o ?� . :--1 . :3 . Cros sm a n . In P l a t o  !9-d ay (London: George A l l e n  e< 
· · nwi n , L t d . , 1 9 3 7 ) , Cros sman d i s cus s e s how Plato might have felt 
o ·Jout t '.1e  mod ern  vmr l d . '.· I e  con c l ud e s  that , wh i l e  Plato wou l d  h ave 
opposed the  S oviet exa lta t ion of mater ial prosperity a nd German 
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� i lita�ism , he wou l d  have s upported the S tal inis t rule by philosophic 
i deal , and wou l d  have adm ired H itler ' s  appreciation of the need to 
sway mind s t h roug h the u se of hal f-tru th s. Crossman argues that 
P la to and , in4eed , modern total i tarians, f a il to appreciate the capa­
c i ty of  t he common man for unders tanding , and overes timate the po-
1· en '� i  .. i1 l for s uprer11a cy hy t 11 e  s ta te. f-Je a.r1ues tha t Plato missed 
that philosophy can never d is-
cove r \·1:1 n t  i s  irr igh t"  or " j us t. "  Crossr:ian's book ha s an understandable 
t o�e  o�  �ea r, a s  he arc ues tha t democracy is losing, and fascism 
� a s  t he i n i t ia � i�e , beca us e  too few are will ing to defend democratic 
!")r j_ n c 5. ple s a ,; 2 i n s t  Pln to ' s a rgument. 
John H. H allowell presents a cogent a nd interesting response to 
P opper a nd Cros sman in h i s  chapter " Pl ato;?and the Moral Foundat ion 
of 2 eLlocra cy r , ( repr�nted i n  Thorson, pp. 1 2 9-149) . He points out 
v�j e  ?la +_· o s.aw the tra n s i tion to ty1�anny as a degeneration of the 
pol i t i cal sys tem ,  and a rg ues that Plato made a s trong theoretical 
2 r ,�· u :11en t  for  freedom. Hal lowell argues  that Plato recogni zed the 
:"' e c r' ror  a. u t hor i ty ., a nd t ha t , it i s  when a s ta t e  lacks authority 
:- '.1 2. ·l- i. t m u s t ru le throug h  brute force. He argues that Plato re­
co�n i zed tha t freedom is the pursuit of perfection , not insatiable 
pa s s i ons. Hal l owell provides more arguments  about the nature of 
:-:· 1 2.  �:. o ' s  pol i cies in h is es say "Pla to and  His Critics, " ( Journal .Qf. 
;:-·' olit ics ( � 7 )  no. 2, : i ay 1965, pp . 2 7 3-? 89, and in h is book, r-,,}ain  
-: urren :: s  :L n ; - :odern Poli t ical Thouo h t  (New York: Henry Hol t & Co. , 
� r:; r::  0 ) . (c f. ;-.1 :i. c ;1 ael 3. Fos ter , Mas ·�·:!!rS  .2.f Poli ti cal 'Thought ( Cam-
The � J vers ide P ress , Houghton i-'!i fflin Co. , 194 1 ) ,  
C:1 2. pte r s  1 - ?..  
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A si�la r  sort of arg ument is made by H . B. Acton in his essay, 
n 'I' he Alleged Fascism of Pl a to" ( reprin ted in 3ambroug h ,  pp. 38-48) . 
Acton equa tes r! a z i i sm with anti-ra t iona l i sm, anti-intellectua lism 
a nd a belief tha t what is  bes t is  what "serves. " He suggests that 
?la to ' s idea s were d iametrically opposed to these. Finally, he 
concludes tha t Plato · expressed fear about the multitude imposing 
t�eir  v iews on the minority, and, as s uch, recognized the need for 
s ecuri ty in a t titudes. 
Ronald Levi nson is not ve�y concerned with the debate over the 
pr i nciples wh i ch lead to "totalitarianism. "  Rather he is concerned 
w i t h  t-efuti n •J t he i n terpretation of writers like Popper, Crossman, 
; . , 5_ n s pear and F i te. In his book , 1!! Defense .Qf Plato (Cambridge : 
'. l a rvard  U n i vers i ty Pres s, 1 9 5 3 ) ,  he sug gests that writers like these 
d i s to�t Pla to ' s argumen t , or, a t  le�st fail to give Plato the bene-
r 5. t of t :,e  do:J :Jt. He disputes Popper's use of the term "historicism" 
i n s tead  o-!: nmethodological essen tLd. i sm"; he argues that Plato, far 
�ro� be i nr a n  ari s tocrat , hel d  contempt for the well•born and wealthy. 
� .. e 1 r 5- n son  �Je l i eves t �.'; �::1 -t Plato ' recognized the need for individual 
f · i l f i llmen t  and , wh i l e rl ato may have underestimated individual 
I 
ca p2ci t ies , he wou ld have welcomed proof tha t he was wrong on this 
poi nt . '.- l e  con c l ude s by s uggesting the Pl ato was, primarily, a 
p � i los opher , whose work s s how us the need to appeal to reason, and 
tha t 2 l a to would have liked modern ideas of pacifism, the town 
xeet i gg :  a nd nu tonation . 
U� ect ion �, ·wo: Pla to as a "Natural Law" Theorist) 
.� e;·· i r: n i n:;::: i n  t :1e ear l y  fifties and s ixties, a group of analysts 
• I • l·.rr i i: J. n c  a d i �fere n t  sort of res ponse to the arguments of Popper 
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and  Crossman. ';_' hese writers suggest t liat:Plato should be associa­
::: e(! no�: \'li th  1 7 totalitarianism , 1 t  but rather with the principle s  of 
na tural l �w. tJr iters who make this argument include Leo Strauss 
( an d  h is s chool ) , John Wild, Joseph P. Maguire and  Robert William 
Hall. 
Perha ps  the mos t  important argument on th i s  sub j ect can be found 
i n  the wri tin0 of Leo Strauss, Herbert Storing, Joseph Cropsey, 
�l l a n  3loom a n d  ot�ers of the S traus sian school. This group con­
s i s ts largely of refugees  from Hitler's Germany and their students, 
who hnve a pa r ticular view of politic s ,  and a particular method 
of  i n terpreta t ion . They argue that the rej ection of absolute prin­
c i p l e s  of pol i t ical rig hts is  an acceptance of nihilism and a li­
cense  for t he ' ' morality"  of the Nazis. Their interpretations are 
c '.'1or-a cte r i zed by an incredibly close at tention to minute  details 
I 
i n  tex t. The S traussians look to Plato as the mentor for the belief 
in  the existence of true and immutable principles, outside the 
e�pir i cal world, which guide political  action, and can be used as 
a s tandard for as�es s i ng the "rightne s s "  of action. 
Straus s f inds the clas sic statement of this position in the 
" utopi a"  of the :1 epublic and the conces sions made to e arthly imper­
f ection  in t he -�· In Natural Rioht � His tory (Chicago: Univer­
s i ty of  Chicago Pres s ,  1 9 5 3) , he discusses  this statement and points 
J(:O v,ha t  he calls t l.1e "cr isis of modern natural right." He argues 
tha t : � o;)be s a n d  Lcc;�e wrongly substituted hedonism for the principle 
thn t one �' 1 s t conform to s tandards independent of the human will; he 
c t tac' : e s  1 : ouss eau 1 somewha t  le s s  vehemently, for making virtue "social, ,  
r2 J.: i·1er than n i nd ividual", and Burke , somewhat more vehemently, for 
conc l  udi niJ tha t convention was the hi9 hest authority. 
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Tn :::I.b.� t 11! Pol itical P h ilosophy'.' (Gl encoe, Il linois : The Free 
? res s, 1 9 5 9 ) , S trauss argues for the rol e  of politica l philosophy 
as the  1 1 urnpire par excell ence" in cla s sica l phi losophy for cla ims 
b �, par t i s a ns , a nd the need to order even immedia te politica l ques ­
J,: i o n s  wl t. h a view toward what is best in the politica l order. 
� t ra u s s  provi d e s  a meticu lous interpretation of Plato, based on 
t he belief tha t  Plato i s  consistent throughout a l l  h i s  works (a 
con s i stency he does not find, for exampl e, in the writings of 
· · o ;J 1.:,es ) .  S trau s s  attack s Machiavelli, and the "historicists " 
�= h i nk ers, li k e  :· ; arx, and Hegel , who belie·,ie tha t  a l l  politica l ac­
t i on  can  be expl ained through the inevitab le force of historica l 
rl evelopment - - arguing tha t  bhese think ers wrong ly see politica l 
a ct i on � s  con d i tioned by circumstance. 
The con s i s tency in Plato's argument throughout his life is 
e :>�plored more f t�l ly  j_ n the l l istory .2f Political Philosophy (Chicago: 
. . a nd . · i c/ al l y  Ca., 1 9 7 2) written b y  S trauss, Cropsey and others. 
T �·1 r-·: a : ; L l·1 0r s po i. n t  to  Pla to's empha s i s  on the reluctance of the 
p� ilosopher to  rul e, and other , les s prominent , sta tements in the 
: e oublic , a s  evidence tha t P l a to really meant to demonstra te why 
s 1J ch a per fect  s tate coul d not possibly  come about. These writers 
2 ::- ,: ue tha t ?l.Q to' s t how�ht pro,,:_: .eessed through the Sta tesman and 
c� l�i na ted in t he presenta tion of the best state man could  achieve 
5- n  t '.1e  l�· ( cf. l:.llan Bl oom's interpretive essay in his trans­
L:. J_ j_ on  of '.f' he ::� epubli c of Pl ato ( New York : Bas ic Books, Inc., 19 6 8 l  
- ·� l oom 2rcues , for example , that Book F1 i  ve is "prepostrous, " and 
wa s mea n t  to drive home the impl ausib ility of t he existence of 
s 1 1. ch a r: epu b l i c ) . 
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/\ l t: ho1y;� :1 \·J ild • s i n t er pre t a tion of  [) J. ato di ffers from S traus s ' s 
': here 2.re  some s i rn ila r l t i e s  l n  the ir respectlve vi ews of  Plato as 
.J. ' i  na  tura 1 law theori s t . " In Plato ' s  l-'lod ern E nemies .§12.9. � Theory 
of  I '. a tura l :__ , aw ( C:h i cac;o : Uni versi ty of Chicago Press, 19 5 3 ) ,  i,,:Jild 
a rg ue s  tha t a u t horitar i a n i sm and dqgmatism stems from relying on 
for�ulations one  cannot explain , and t h at Plato demonstrated the  
n eed for reason to guide  our  action. T he first half of the  book 
conta i n s  a defense  of P l a to ,  where he concludes that what separates 
:· �· 1 2. to 2nd  T.)opp e r  .is  not really a diff erence ln att itude about 
:1 il i ta ri sm  or e ta t i sm, b u t  merely the  f a ct tha t  P l a t o  believes tha t 
ph i l osophy i s  rea l l y pos sible. The second half of the book presents 
2. n or (· u: ·.1 en  t t h 2  1-. P 1 a to  i s  real 1 y the source of a u natural law" 
� rad i t ion , ba s ed on h i s  belief  in the correctnes s  and beauty of 
na tural princi ples of order. i:,Jild ar�:ue s  that Hobbes and Locke 
deviated f rom t h i s  trad i tion in thinking that nature i s  something 
to  he overcome , but t hat Locke and Pai n e  helped to transmi t t h is 
.::: r-ad j_ t .i on to .i\meri ca n t h i n k ing. ( cf. '..:Ji ld' s Plato ' s Theon .2f Man 
( J,! e�:l ·::· or'.·: : Oc t a -::: o n  Jook s ,  1 9 4 6 , 19 74) where he draws some of the 
impl i ca t ion s of h i s  pos i t ion to the startli ng conclusion tha t Plato ' s 
d e 1_ 1 e n e ra t i on 0 -F.· '- the s t a t e s  ha s a ctually taken place throug h human 
'osep :1 i a�; u i re 1 i n k s F l a to to a much more g enera 1 tradi tion of 
n 2 t�r2 l law -- the t  of a bel i ef in the existence of princi ple s which 
�-- �-� .:::· r: s cend  t 1·1e ernpi ric ,::.l wo i.:-ld. I n  " Plato ' s  Theory of N atural Law, " 
i n  A l fred � - Selli ncer , ed. Yale Classical Studies (New Haven: 
· · a l e  · . n i ve rs i ty :? r e s �� , 1 9 4 7) ,  v .  10 , pp. 1 5 1- 1 78) , Mag uire argues 
J . '1 2. �:: t h i s  con cept  o-f: natural lav,1 applies equally to the "utilitari ans " 
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and  even thinker s  who hold 1 1s ubj ectiveu v iews of wha t these pr inci­
ples  are. The  re s t  of  h i s  a nal ysi s i s  a discuss ion of some of 
t he elements of t he view of  principles  as it  is seen in several 
of  t h e  d i al og ue s. 
R obert Will iam  Hal l l ink s Pla to to the rel ated tradition of 
n ind i viduali sm. n In Pla to and l.t!!:, I ndividual ( The H ague, t,:etherlands : 
a r t  i n i. 1. s N .ij nof f , 'J. 9 6 3 ) , he argues tha t ,  desp i te the fac t  tha t  the 
:c ee1-� s  h2.d no comparable word for "individual,  r r  Pl ato was essen-
t i 2  l l y  a n  i nd i v id ual i s�. H a ll bel i eves i t  is accura te to appl y  
� h i s  term to ? l a to beca use h e  bel i eved tha t ind ividual s were the 
�2 s i s un i t  of  soc i al s truc ture, ins tead of exis ting for such struc­
t :  ..1 res. :- ial l ar�J ues tha t !?l a to had a deep concern for the excellence 
of ea ch  i nd i vid ual -- a concern which continued even af ter indivi­
d t.1.2. l s  d ied and lef t the ool i s. Hal l concludes by ar<;Juing tha t 
P l a to ' s concept ion of the individual ' s separa tion from society, 
i nd i vi d u a l  f reedom and respon s ibil i ty  for action and the equal ity 
o�  al l men , are  the sta ndard by wh ich one can determine what indivi -
d 1 . i 2 l i s m i s .  
( --·; ect i o n  ·�·.-- 11 1:ee : P l a to o. s  a "Limi ts- to-c; rowth " Theorist) 
·,· n t : -: e 1da k e  of i ncrea s i. n s::r concern a bou t environmental i ssues , 
t '. 1ere ·:12 s :)e e n  a recent movement to s ee Pla to as an apos tle of 
per sonal 1 and  societal l im i tation. This l ine of thinking may be­
co�e more  impor t a nt a s  i s s ues  l ike energ y use an� pp�lution begin 
to  occupy more s i g n i f icant space in political di scuss ion. 
/\ n 5. n tere s �: i n '::-- i nterpre ta t ion .:of Pl ato's pos i tion on qrowth comes 
� . . r- 01:1 , � . 1 1 ford n • ·:-; i. b 1 e y ( s upra • ) • s i b 1 e y argues that P 1 a to and the 
�_. ! :: :o l e  I f  c l a s s  i ca 1 trad iti on  1 1  ref J ected on the na ture of  man , and had 
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a concept ion of man's place in his environment. He arg ues that 
Pla to wa s quite con cerned with  the problem of s tabili ty and human 
psycho log y in l arge and chang i ng societ ies. Sibley sees in Socra­
tes' d i sagreeme n t wi th Polemarchus and Cephalus the argument that 
·c > �� i n crease in human wants leads to increasing complexity, s pecia­
U. za �.:J.on and con flict, a nd points to the � as evidence that 
P l a to recogn i zed the  need to limit population and provide social 
�:1 1 2. n n i. nn . : - l e con c l udes t �a t  i t  i s  the classical spiri t which 
po i n t s  us  i n  t he d irection of limit s . 
\,H lli am Cpr1 uls  i n  E-: coloov .fillQ, � Politics of Scarcity ( San 
, ·· ranci sco :  w .  H. Freeman t',: Co . , '1. 9 7 7) uses Plato somewha t different ly .  
· · s i n 0  the ima ,:.e o f  the ' 'parable of the ship" Ophuls argues that 
:? 1 2. to shows u s  v1ha t happens when · · society approaches the point 
where it can  no longer be con trolled. Ophuls specifically rejec ts 
? l a to ' s met a phys ics, a nd argues from a perspective which he calls a 
" �  ·I 2. 1 J= '.rJ s i 2 n v iew o :f b i o 1 og i ca 1 n ece s s i t y • r r He a 1 so re j e ct s P 1 a t  o ' s 
v iew of govern8ent , arguing , wi th Popper, that Plato shows us what 
':le :·.w t7 t a.void  -- i. e .  the  rule by t hose who "know . "  ,�)phuls s uggests 
t i;a t ':Je ca nnot accept a rule by "bene,.rolent guardians" much les s 
v., 0, 1 ' r. 1 1le by t echnocr a t s "  wh i ch may result if th ings con tinue to 
:.) e cor.ie more a nd rnore complex. 
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